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ABSTRACT

This study investigated the viability of an instrument
called the Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI), a pen-andpaper instrument intended to measure attitudes toward nature
that, according to naturalist Edward O. Wilson, are rooted
in an innate predisposition that humans possess to connect
with other forms of life. Utilizing confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA), two models were tested (n=334)--a sevenfactor model that reflected Stephen Kellert’s biophilia
typology and a more parsimonious two-factor model. However,
neither model proved viable in terms of construct validity.
As a result, a new model with four factors was developed via
exploratory factor analysis (EFA). A subsequent CFA revealed
a reasonable fit between the data and the four-factor model.
An inspection of the correlations between the four factors
and established measures of attitudes toward nature provided
evidence of the four-factor model’s convergent and
discriminant validity.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Biologist Edward O. Wilson (1984) asserted that humans
have an innate predisposition, which he called "biophilia,"
to connect with other forms of life, especially in ways that
have proven advantageous from an evolutionary standpoint.
Many scholars and researchers have pointed out human
behaviors that ostensibly demonstrate the existence of
biophilia. For example, Wilson (1984) noted that biophilia
is evidenced by the "quickness and decisiveness with which
[humans] learn particular things about certain kinds of
plants and animals," a trait that Gardner (1999) called
"naturalist intelligence" and described as a "fascination
with plants and animals and a drive to identify, classify,
and interact with them." Additionally, Ulrich (1993) argued
that biophilia is indicated by the preference of modern
humans for viewing natural landscapes over urban scenes.
Feral (1998) and others asserted that observed therapeutic
and salutary effects on modern humans of contact with nature
supports claims regarding the existence of biophilia.
However, only one researcher, Yale University’s Stephen R.
Kellert, has attempted to create instrumentation to measure
biophilia-related attitudes. In the early 1970s, Kellert
began collecting data on the attitudes of Americans toward
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animals, using instrumentation built around a typology of
attitudes toward animals. In most of Kellert’s works, this
typology of attitudes included the following dimensions:
1) Dominionism, i.e., nature is meant to challenge
humans and be mastered by humans;
2) Ecologism/Scientism, i.e., nature is an intriguing
system of interdependence among species and natural
habitats, as well as a fascinating object of study;
3) Humanism, i.e., nature provides humans with
opportunities to fulfill emotional needs for
bonding, intimacy, and companionship;
4) Moralism, i.e., the natural world and its non-human
inhabitants have moral standing and thus should not
be exploited or abused;
5) Naturalism, i.e., direct contact with nature,
especially in unadulterated milieus, provides humans
with emotional satisfaction;
6) Negativism, i.e., nature is uncomfortable,
disgusting, and/or dangerous; and
7) Utilitarianism, i.e., nature is merely or primarily
a resource for humans to utilize.
Kellert continued collecting this data and refining his
instrumentation across many studies (Kellert, 1974, 1976a,
1976b, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1993b, 1993c, 2005; Kellert &
Berry, 1981; Kellert & Westervelt, 1983) for the next two
decades, eventually incorporating ideas about biophilia into
his work and re-interpreting his earlier efforts in terms of
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the construct biophilia.
However, the results of Kellert’s instrumentationdevelopment efforts have been mixed and constrained by
methodological limitations. For example, none of these
studies report the extent to which Kellert’s instruments are
correlated with other measures of similar constructs (i.e.,
convergent and discriminant validity evidence). Moreover,
very few of the studies report the use of advanced
statistical methods (e.g., factor-analytic techniques) to
investigate the construct validity of the dimensions in
Kellert’s typology. Finally, in nearly all the Kellert texts
that discuss biophilia (Kellert, 1993a, 1996, 1997, 2002),
the empirical evidence utilized to demonstrate the existence
of biophilic values is actually data collected during
earlier studies (Kellert, 1974, 1976a, 1979, 1993c; Kellert
& Berry, 1981; Kellert & Westervelt, 1983) that had a much
more limited focus, i.e., the measurement of attitudes
toward animals only, excluding all other organisms that
might be considered "wildlife" and all other phenomena that
might be called "nature." Consequently, the data collected
by Kellert constitutes very weak empirical support for his
typology of biophilic attitudes.
In the past decade, a small number of scholars have
conducted empirical studies that employed Kellert’s typology
(Drews, 2002; Thompson & Mintzes, 2002; Rauwald & Moore,
2002; Barney et al., 2005; Lukas & Ross, 2005; Prokop &
Kubiatko, 2008). These studies represented the first
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technically sophisticated and reasonably transparent
attempts to examine the dimensionality of Kellert’s
typology. While these studies failed to confirm Kellert’s
typology, they were too few in number and too limited in
scope (e.g., focusing on only one species or on only the
indigenous fauna of a small geographical area) to pose a
serious challenge to Kellert’s ideas. As a result, before
anything definitive can be stated regarding the soundness of
Kellert’s theory, his typology needs to be tested
empirically by studies that are at least as methodologically
rigorous but broader in scope than those conducted in the
last decade.
For environmental educators, the administration of a
reliable, stable, and valid instrument based on Kellert’s
typology could yield results that aid in the planning and
execution of lessons. With such results, the environmentaleducation instructor could tailor some learning tasks to
activate and thus capitalize upon students’ individual biophilic attitudes, which both Wilson and Kellert have asserted are pre-programmed through the evolutionary experience
of the human species and triggered by individual experience.1 Alternatively, results from the administration of

1

This notion echoes to an extent the beliefs of sociocultural psychologists who assert that the capacity of students
to absorb and process the information and skills is in no
small part determined by previously acquired knowledge,
skills, beliefs, and attitudes. However, whereas the sociocultural psychologists view learning as a predominantly an
ontogenetic developmental process, Wilson’s and Kellert’s
notions regarding biophilia suggest that phylogenetics also
4

such an instrument may alert the instructor to the presence,
among his or her students, of potentially negative biophilic
attitudes that may need to be inhibited lest they generate
resistance to interference and thereby decrease the efficacy
of learning tasks. These results would be especially useful
if correlated with other measures of student attitudes
toward the outdoors or nature-based experiences, such as the
Ecocentric/Anthropocentric/Environmental Apathy Scale
(Gagnon-Thompson & Barton, 1994), Environmental Motives
Scale (Schultz, 2000), Revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale
(Dunlap, et. al., 2000), Connectedness to Nature Scale
(Mayer & McPherson-Frantz, 2004), and Nature Relatedness
Scale (Nisbet, et. al., 2008).
Consequently, this dissertation will focus on the
construction and validation of a reliable, stable, and valid
instrument that utilizes Kellert’s typology to measure
biophilic attitudes but that does not suffer from the
limitations of work completed by Kellert or his successors.
Purpose of the Study
This study has three main purposes:
1)

Develop a Kellert-like instrument that fully represents (i.e., includes non-animal aspects of nature)
the construct biophilia. This instrument will be
called the Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI);

play a significant role in the acquisition of beliefs, knowledge, and skills, as well as in our capacity and tendency
to selectively attend to some types of stimuli and not to
others.
5

2)

Utilize appropriate data-analytic procedures to
investigate the BAI’s dimensionality; and

3)

Collect convergent and discriminant evidence2 for
the BAI’s validity by examining the extent to which
the BAI correlates with well-established measures
of environmental attitudes.

To serve the aforementioned purposes, this study will pose
and answer four research questions, which are stated below.
Research Questions
The research questions addressed in this study are:
1)

Can a reliable, stable, and valid measure of
biophilic attitudes be developed based on Kellert’s
7 dimensions?

2)

Will the instrument’s (i.e, the BAI’s) dimensionality confirm or fail to confirm Kellert’s typology?

3)

If Kellert’s typology is not confirmed, how might
biophilia be reconceptualized based on the results
of the data analysis conducted in this study?

4)

Does the instrument (i.e., the BAI) and/or its
respective subscales correlate in expected ways
with other well-established measures of
environmental attitudes?

To answer these questions, I will collect data and use it to

2

Strong correlations in expected ways between a new scale
and measures of related constructs constitute convergent
evidence of the new scale’s validity. Non- or weak
correlations between a new scale and measures of unrelated
constructs constitute discriminant evidence of the new
scale’s validity (Furr & Bacharach, 2008).
6

assess the plausibility of the two competing hypotheses
(i.e., the full-model versus reduced-model) I discuss below.
Hypotheses
I will compare two hypotheses which I call the fullmodel hypothesis and the reduced-model hypothesis.

The

former hypothesis states that biophilia, as measured by the
BAI, includes seven dimensions.

The latter hypothesis

states that biophilia has two dimensions.
The full-model hypothesis that will be tested in this
study is:
1)

Biophilia, as measured by the BAI, has seven
dimensions:

2)

a)

Dominionism;

b)

Ecologism/Scientism;

c)

Humanism;

d)

Moralism;

e)

Naturalism;

f)

Negativism; and

g)

Utilitarianism.

If the seven-dimension structure of BAI is confirmed, the BAI subscales will correlate significantly
with other measures of environmental attitudes in
expected ways (cf., Table 7).

The reduced-model hypothesis that will be tested in
this study is:
1)

Biophilia, as measured by the BAI, has two
dimensions:
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a)

Biophilia, i.e., nature is beneficial to the
intellectual and emotional development of
humans and deserves to be held in high regard.

b)

Biophobia, i.e., nature is frequently a
nuisance, obstacle, or threat to humans and has
value only to the extent it can be controlled
and thereby exploited.

In this scenario, BAI items previously associated
with Ecologism/Scientism, Humanism, Moralism, and
Naturalism will load on Biophilia. BAI items previously associated with Dominionism, Negativism, and
Utilitarianism will load on Biophobia. These beliefs
may be related to fears of nature or outdoor experiences described by Orr (1993), Ulrich (1993), and
Wilson (1993).
2) In the two-dimension structure, the Biophilia and
Biophobia subscales will correlate significantly
with other measures of environmental attitudes in
expected ways (cf., Table 8).
Benefits to the Research Literature
This study will contribute to the research literature
by providing a methodologically rigorous test of Kellert’s
typology. Thus, the results of this study can contribute to
the case for or against the validity of Kellert’s theory.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, the results of this study
may aid in the development of a stable environmentalattitudes assessment based on Kellert’s work.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview
Biologist Edward O. Wilson (1984) asserted that humans
have an innate predisposition, which he called biophilia, to
connect with other forms of life. Many scholars and
researchers have pointed out human behaviors that ostensibly
demonstrate the existence of biophilia (Faber-Taylor, et
al., 1998, 2001; Feral, 1998; Frumkin, 2001; Gathright,
Yamada, & Morita, 2006; Heerwagen & Orians, 1993; Katcher &
Wilkins, 1993; Kuo & Faber-Taylor, 2004; Lawrence, 1993;
Morita, et al., 2007; Townsend, 2006; Ulrich, et al., 1991;
Ulrich, 1993; Velarde, Fry, & Tveit, 2007; Wells & Evans,
2003; Wilson, 1984, 1993). However, only one researcher,
Stephen R. Kellert, has attempted to create instrumentation
to measure biophilia-related attitudes (Kellert, 1974,
1976a, 1976b, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1993b, 1993c, 2005;
Kellert & Berry, 1981; Kellert & Westervelt, 1983), and the
results of his efforts have been mixed. Consequently, this
dissertation will focus on the development of a reliable,
stable, and valid measure of biophilia-related attitudes.
The literature review for this dissertation begins with
a description of biophilia as it has been conceptualized by
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biologist Edward O. Wilson (who coined the term "biophilia")
and others. Then, the review focuses on the many efforts of
Kellert to develop instrumentation to measure biophilia,
beginning in the early 1970s and continuing through 2005,
and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of Kellert’s
work. Next, the review examines published studies by other
researchers who utilized and adapted Kellert’s typology of
biophilic attitudes (Thompson & Mintzes, 2002; Rauwald &
Moore, 2002; Drews, 2002; Lukas & Ross, 2005; Barney et al.,
2005; Prokop & Kubiatko, 2008), focusing particularly on the
ways in which these researchers addressed (and failed to
address) some of the deficiencies in Kellert’s work.
Additionally, the review describes how the shortcomings in
Kellert’s work and the work of his successors requires
further efforts to develop and validate an instrument with
items that fully represent the construct biophilia. Finally,
the review specifies the research questions to be addressed
and the hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation.
This literature review’s predominant and narrow focus
on Kellert and other researchers who have adapted Kellert’s
typology is deliberate because this dissertation is essentially an exercise in scale development. The first step in
the development of any scale is to identify the boundaries
of the phenomena that the scale will attempt to measure
(DeVellis, 2003). To accomplish this task, scale developers
typically look to relevant theory and to prior efforts of
other researchers to define and measure the phenomena.

10

What is Biophilia?
Biologist Edward O. Wilson (1984) asserted that humans
have an innate predisposition, which he called biophilia, to
connect with other forms of life. Wilson claimed that
evidence for the existence of biophilia was ubiquitous:
[Biophilia] unfolds in the predictable fantasies and
responses of individuals from early childhood onward.
It cascades into repetitive patterns of culture across
most or all societies, a consistency often noted in the
literature of anthropology. These processes appear to
be part of the programs of the brain . . . They are too
consistent to be dismissed as the result of purely
historical events working on a mental blank slate
(Wilson, 1984).
Wilson (1993) describes biophilia as "not a single instinct
but a complex set of learning rules" that shape human
behavioral responses to environmental phenomena, influencing
the extent to which such phenomena generate feelings of awe,
indifference, attraction, aversion, serenity, anxiety, and
so on. Consequently, biophilia is a multidimensional concept
that includes both positive and negative components. As
Sagan and Margulis (1993) observe, "there is no simple
biophilia, no unconditional, unchanging love for members of
other species . . . the presence of biophilia suggests we
not only love birds and flowers but also have an inbred
contempt, distaste, and perhaps even hatred of certain other
life forms." What Wilson and others call biophilia (which
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literally means "love of life") might be more appropriately
described as prototaxis: "the generalized tendency of cells
and organisms to react to each other in distinct ways"
(Sagan & Margulis, 1993). Nevertheless, this document will
use the term biophilia since it is by far the most commonly
used descriptor for the phenomenon that is the focus of this
inquiry.
From an evolutionary standpoint, biophilia promoted
successful adaptation to environmental conditions across the
hundreds of millennia that humans lived exclusively as
hunter-gatherers in close association with nature. In other
words, individuals and groups most influenced by biophilic
rules were also most likely to survive and propagate,
thereby genetically and culturally transmitting these rules
to future generations (Wilson, 1993).
Wilson (1993) asserts that biophilia has not been
eradicated in the 8,000 to 10,000 years since people began
living in stationary villages and tilling the soil nor in
the few centuries since people began re-locating en masse to
urban and suburban habitats: "[Biophilic rules] persist from
generation to generation, atrophied and fitfully manifested
in the artificial new environments into which technology has
catapulted humanity." According to Wilson and others,
present-day manifestations of biophilia in humans include
the:


"quickness and decisiveness with which [humans]
learn particular things about certain kinds of
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plants and animals" (Wilson, 1984), a trait that
Gardner (1999) called "naturalist intelligence" and
described as a "fascination with plants and animals
and a drive to identify, classify, and interact
with them";


Fears and phobias that modern humans (i.e.,
information-age humans in industrialized nations)
exhibit of natural phenomena (e.g., snakes,
spiders, darkness) that posed a constant threat to
people in prehistoric eras (Ulrich, 1993; Wilson,
1993);



Omnipresence of serpents as prominent and powerful
agents in the mythologies of nearly all human
cultures (Wilson, 1993);



Widespread use of animals as symbols in human
language and literature (Lawrence, 1993);



Attraction of modern humans to open spaces with
lush vegetation, scattered trees, and conspicuous
water features, resembling the savannas of east
Africa, where humans originated and evolved
(Heerwagen & Orians, 1993; Ulrich, 1993);



Aversion of modern humans toward closed spaces,
which in the prehistoric era would have hidden
predators and hostile conspecifics and would have
presented human quarry with limited avenues for
escape (Heerwagen & Orians, 1993; Ulrich, 1993);



Preference of modern humans for viewing natural
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landscapes over urban scenes (Ulrich, 1993);


Stress-reducing and restoration effects on modern
humans of visiting, or even just viewing, nonthreatening, natural settings or water features
(Frumkin, 2001; Gathright, Yamada, & Morita, 2006;
Katcher & Wilkins, 1993; Morita, et al., 2007;
Ulrich, et al., 1991; Ulrich, 1993; Velarde, Fry, &
Tveit, 2007; Wells & Evans, 2003);



Therapeutic and salutary effects on modern humans
of contact with nature (Feral, 1998; Frumkin, 2001;
Katcher & Wilkins, 1993; Kuo & Faber-Taylor, 2004;
Townsend, 2006; Velarde, Fry, & Tveit, 2007); and



Enhancement of creativity, mental discipline, and
higher-level cognitive functioning in modern humans
associated with exposure to nature (Faber-Taylor,
et al., 1998, 2001; Ulrich, 1993).

The consensus among biophilia researchers is that the
phenomenon, while innate, is not uniformly manifested across
the species. Rather, the extent to which and manner in which
an individual exhibits biophilia is dependent on the
environmental stimuli and cultural conditioning to which he
or she is exposed. Kellert (2005) describes the components
of biophilia as "‘weak’ biological, or inherent, tendencies
that are greatly influenced by learning and experience
within a cultural and community context." Concurring with
Kellert and with Wilson’s (1993) comment that biophilic
programming can be "mediated by rules of prepared or
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counterprepared learning," Nabhan and St. Antoine (1993)
note:
. . . a child’s learning environment greatly conditions
the expression of any genetic basis for biophilia.
Unless the appropriate environmental triggers are
present in a certain cultural/environmental context,
biophilia is unlikely to be fully expressed . . .
Biophilia, then, may take on different shapes and
shades in its expression within various cultures and
individuals, depending on the degree of exposure to and
engagement with other organisms.
In contrast, the determinants of biophobia, which Orr
(1993) defines as the "culturally acquired urge to affiliate
with technology, human artifacts, and solely with human
interests regarding the natural world," are mostly extrinsic
to human nature. Orr (1993) notes that biophobia is
"increasingly common among people raised with television,
Walkman radios attached to their heads, video games, living
amidst shopping malls, freeways, and dense urban or suburban
settings where nature is permitted tastefully, as
decoration." According to Orr, biophobic individuals often
feel "[discomfort] with the nature that lies beyond [their]
direct control," sometimes exhibit "active scorn for
whatever is not man-made, managed, or air-conditioned," and
frequently "regard nature ‘objectively’ as nothing more than
‘resources’ to be used any way the favored among the present
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generation see fit."3 Pierre-Louis (2010) concurs, conceding
that some aspects of biophobia may be innate (e.g., the fear
of snakes exhibited by humans and most primates) but noting
that “most of our biophobia is a learned condition - think
of the stereotype of the unsettled city slicker when facing
their first evening in the great outdoors, or the way many
lawn care commercials are about ‘taming the outdoors.’”
How Has Biophilia Been Measured?
The only researcher to attempt the systematic
measurement of biophilia-related attitudes is Stephen R.
Kellert. Beginning in the early 1970’s, Kellert collected
voluminous amounts of data in the long-term development and
refinement of a typology of attitudes toward nature
(Kellert, 1974, 1976a, 1976b, 1978, 1979, 1985; Kellert &
Berry, 1980; Kellert & Westervelt, 1983). This typology
later evolved in response to Wilson’s biophilia hypothesis
(Kellert, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2005).
Kellert’s typology, which in his post-1993 publications is
described as a "typology of values" rather than a "typology
of attitudes," includes up to 10 components. The eight
components examined across most of Kellert’s publications,
as well as a brief description of each component, appear in
Table 1.

3

Ulrich (1993) also used the term biophobia, but he did so
to describe biophilia’s negative components--the "over time
remembered, negative/avoidance responses" to "dangers associated with natural settings"--that provided humans with an
adaptive advantage as they evolved during the prehistoric
era.
16

Table 1
Kellert’s Typology of Biophilic Attitudes/Values
Attitude/Value

Description

Naturalism

Nature is a venue for exploration and first-hand
discovery.

Humanism

Nature provides emotional satisfaction.

Moralism

Nature is inherently valuable and should be
preserved.

Dominionism

Nature is meant for humans to control.

Utilitarianism

Nature is a reservoir of material resources for
humans.

Negativism

Nature is dirty, dangerous, and/or scary.

Ecologism

Nature is a fascinating system of interrelated
processes.

Scientism

Nature is an object worthy of empirical study.

Kellert asserts that each of the attitudes/values described
in Table 1, is an aspect of human affiliation with nature.
Moreover, Keller contends that each attitude/value, as it
was manifested during prehistoric times, provided humans
with an adaptive advantage that permitted them to survive
and propagate.
Kellert’s Empirical Studies of Attitudes toward Animals
Kellert’s research program to measure biophilic
attitudes began, oddly enough, more than a decade before the
publication of Wilson’s Biophilia (1984). With financial
support from the Fish and Wildlife Service of the U.S.
Department of the Interior, Kellert (1974) conducted an
investigation into American attitudes toward animals,
prompted by the "continuing importance of animals in modern
society" and by what he claimed was a lack of any systematic
effort to arrive at "some integrated understanding of
[human-animal relationships]." According to Kellert (1974),
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an attitude "encompasses feelings and beliefs, i.e., an
affective and a cognitive component . . . [that] are
generally directed toward choice and decision-making and,
therefore [sic] involve elements of perception and
motivational force." Moreover, Kellert stated that
One’s basic feelings and beliefs about animals . . .
largely determine the direction and degree of one’s
involvement with animals, and not vice versa . . .
Thus, before a person became involved in a given animal
activity, there were probably certain underlying
attitudes toward animals which motivated and directed
his or her specific area of interest.
Consequently, to gather data regarding American attitudes
toward animals, Kellert (1974) conducted personal, in-depth
interviews with 61 individuals (12 women and 49 men with a
mean age of 45) from 20 different states who were known to
have "a significant level of interest of involvement with
animals" and who had "already established well-defined,
though perhaps exaggerated, views on animals." Kellert
selected this small, non-probabilistic sample because he
believed that from "a study population of people who were
deeply involved with animals, certain basic attitudinal
types would hopefully stand out in greater relief, and would
in turn be applicable to the views of the general public."
Each interview was divided into four parts:
1. Unstructured section with open-ended questions
regarding sample members’ "background experiences with

18

animals."
2. Unstructured section "focused on [sample member’s]
current animal activities" and "[consisting] largely of
in-depth probes regarding attitudes, opinions, skills,
primary satisfactions and interests involving animals."
3. Structured section containing 24 three-point (i.e.,
agree, neutral, disagree), Likert-scale items regarding
"animal-related issues" (e.g., "Pets represent, for me,
one of the major sources of satisfaction in life.") and
18 such items focused on "social and philosophical
topics" (e.g., "War is inherent in human nature.").4
4. Structured section containing mostly close-ended
"demographic and life style questions."
Based on a qualitative analysis5 of the interview data,
Kellert (1974) developed a typology of seven attitudinal
orientations (i.e., Naturalistic, Ecologistic, Humanistic,
Moralistic, Scientistic, Aesthetic, and Dominionistic), each
of which comprised "a set of overlapping and interrelated
beliefs and feelings" about animals. For example, according

4

Kellert (1974) notes that, during an earlier pilot study,

"using such techniques as factor and content analysis"
revealed that these 42 items were "the most relevant,

significant and differentiating of people’s attitudes."
However, Kellert did not provide any detailed information
regarding the aforementioned analyses.
5
Kellert (1974) provides little detail regarding the
qualitative analysis that yielded the typology, other than
stating that the typology was largely a "theoretical and
subjective construction . . . formulated after lengthy
discussions with the [sample members], repeated examinations
of the interview transcripts, and extensive readings of both
professional and lay readings on the subject of man and
animals."
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to Kellert, a person with the "Naturalistic" attitudinal
orientation would be very interested in direct contact with
nature, feel affection for wildlife, believe in the
superiority of the natural over built environments, be
strongly interested in hunting-and-gathering activities that
can be described as "living off the land," and view death as
a natural process. Kellert (1974) was careful to note that
rarely would any single individual manifest all the beliefs
and feelings associated with a particular attitudinal
orientation. Moreover, Kellert observed that very few
individuals would be adequately described by one attitudinal
orientation only. However, Kellert observed that most
persons have a dominant orientation that can be identified.
After developing the typology, Kellert (1974) assigned
to each sample member (n=61) at least one primary
attitudinal orientation (PAO) based on a content analysis of
that person’s responses to the first and second sections of
the interview. One or more secondary attitude orientations
(SAOs) were also assigned to some sample members.6
To investigate the validity of the typology, Kellert
(1974) conducted a multiple discriminant function analysis
(MFDA) using data from the 58 persons assigned only one PAO
as a result of the previously described content analysis. In
this MFDA, Kellert designated the items from third and
6

Fifty-seven sample members were assigned one PAO; three,
were assigned two PAOs. Twenty-eight sample members were
assigned one SAO; 33, were assigned two SAOs. The total
number of PAO assignments was 64; the total number of SAO
assignments, 94.
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fourth parts of the interview as independent variables and
designated PAO as the dependent variable. After retaining
the 20 most discriminating interview items in the MFDA,
Kellert found that 97% of sample members were correctly
classified, i.e., assigned to the same group by the MFDA as
they had been in the content analysis. Additionally, Kellert
provided a canonical discriminant function graph that
visually demonstrated that, except for the ecologistically
oriented, a definite distinctiveness and independence exists
among the attitudinal orientations. To be sure, the results
of Kellert (1974) should be viewed with some skepticism
since the researcher neglected to provide many key pieces of
information. For example, Kellert did not report means and
standard deviations for any of the interview items, Wilks’
lambda, degrees of freedom, or group centroids. Likewise,
Kellert did not supply a structure matrix for each
discriminant function. Nevertheless, Kellert was able to
replicate statistically with one data set (i.e., responses
to the close-ended items in the third and fourth parts of
the interview) the group assignments that he had made
qualitatively with a different data set (i.e., the responses
to the open-ended items in the first and second parts of the
interview), a feat that suggests that his typology of
attitudinal orientations toward animals has validity.
Kellert (1976a) and Kellert (1976b) describe a followup study to Kellert (1974) in which the researcher utilized
the typology of attitudinal orientations toward animals to
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design, pre-test, and ultimately administer (via a 45-minute
interview) a close-ended, structured questionnaire to 553
residents of randomly selected geographical units (e.g.,
city blocks) throughout the United States. The goal of this
study was to "determine the distribution of [the attitudinal
orientations identified in the Kellert (1974)] within the
American public." Kellert (1976a) reports that the
questionnaire was divided into four sections: 1) attitudes
toward animals; 2) knowledge of animals; 3) activities
involving animals; and 4) social and personal
characteristics of the questionnaire respondents. The 67
"attitudes toward animals" items that appeared on the
Kellert (1976a; 1976b) questionnaire were selected from an
initial pool of more than 1,000 items that were generated
from inspection and analysis of interview data collected for
Kellert (1974). The "attitudes toward animals" items
encompassed a wide swath of wildlife-related issues,
including:
endangered species, wildlife preservation, hunting,
trapping, zoos, training of animals, killing of animals
for their furs, killing of animals for meat, medical
experimentation, predator control, pet relationships,
extermination of pests, vivisection, destruction versus
preservation of wildlife habitat, spiritual
relationships to animals and the natural world,
trapping, liking and disliking of animals, harvesting
surplus of wild game, rodeos, bullfighting,
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cockfighting, dog fighting, scientific study of
animals, fear of animals, horse racing, superstition
connected with animals, utilitarian exploitation of
animals, and miscellaneous other topics. (Kellert,
1976a)
However, for purposes of the questionnaire, the definition
of the word "animal" was restricted to birds and mammals
"because attitudes toward insects, reptiles and fish are
often different from attitudes toward mammals and birds."
Cluster analysis of pilot data was utilized to both
select the final 67 "attitudes toward animals" items for the
questionnaire and to assign each item to one of nine
attitude scales: naturalistic, ecologistic, humanistic,
moralistic, scientistic, aesthetic, dominionistic,
utilitarian, and negativistic (Kellert, 1976a). The former
six scales were conceptually the same as their namesakes in
Kellert (1974). However, the seventh scale, dominionistic,
was redefined in Kellert (1976a, 1976b) to mean merely an
"interest in mastering and controlling animals"; an eighth
scale, utilitarian, was added to describe an "interest based
largely on how animals may practically and material benefit
human beings"; and a ninth scale, negativism, was added to
describe "indifference, dislike and fear of animals ... a
fundamental sense of separation and alienation from the
animal and natural world."
Unfortunately, Kellert (1976a) reports no statistics
associated with the aforementioned cluster analysis; instead
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the document includes an appendix with a generic description
of cluster analysis as a class of data-analytic techniques.
Moreover, Kellert (1976a) provides no reliability
coefficients for the overall "attitudes toward animals"
questionnaire nor for any of the individual attitude scales.
Each scale ultimately contained between 6 and 15 items,
with some items appearing on more than one scale. Each item
was structured as a declarative statement (e.g., "I think
circuses tend to degrade and humiliate animals.") to which
the respondents were asked to indicate agreement or
disagreement using a five-point, Likert scale with the
following point descriptors: Strongly Agree, Slightly Agree,
Slightly Disagree, Strongly Disagree, and No Opinion).
For eight of the nine scales, a respondent’s score was
derived solely from his or her weighted responses to
questionnaire items associated with the scale. "Strongly
Agree" responses (and "Strongly Disagree" responses on
reverse coded items) were assigned a weight of 2, while
"Slightly Agree" responses (and "Slightly Disagree"
responses on reverse coded items) were assigned a weight of
"1". However, four points were added to the scientistic
score of all respondents who performed exceptionally well
(i.e., in the top 25%) on a 24-item, true-or-false
"knowledge quiz," a procedure that Kellert (1976a) claimed
was justified because "considerable factual knowledge of
animals is an intrinsic aspect of the scientistic attitude."
Kellert (1976a) reports high correlations (i.e., r
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greater than 0.5) between the following attitude categories:
dominionistic and utilitarian, naturalistic and ecologistic,
naturalistic and scientistic, moralistic and humanistic, and
moralistic and ecologistic. Kellert (1976a) reports moderate
correlations (i.e., r greater than 0.3) between the
following attitude categories: dominionistic and
negativistic, utilitarian and negativistic, moralistic and
naturalistic, humanistic and naturalistic, and scientistic
and ecologistic. (Correlational coefficients for the
aesthetic attitude scale were not reported.) However, any
interpretation of these coefficients must be approached with
caution, as Kellert (1976a) does not report the results on
any significance tests. Moreover, the magnitudes of some of
these correlational coefficients are inflated due to items
being shared between the scales. For example, the strength
of the direct relationship between the moralistic and the
ecologistic scales (r=0.6344) is suspect because the scales
share two items that are worded, coded, and weighted
identically. Similarly, the strength of the inverse
relationship between the naturalistic and negativistic
scales appears questionable because the scales share three
items that are worded and weighted identically and coded in
opposite directions.
Kellert (1976b) notes that, for purposes of
ascertaining differences in the prevalence of the
aforementioned attitudes among various groups represented in
the sample, only six of the attitude types could be
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examined, explaining that "indices of the aesthetic,
scientistic and, to a lesser degree, ecologistic attitudes
were not particularly reliable or valid." Still, Kellert
(1976b) does not describe how the reliability or validity of
any of the attitude indices was investigated beyond stating
they "were created largely by examining the results of a
statistical technique referred to as cluster analysis."
Kellert (1978) utilizes the same dataset as Kellert
(1976a) and Kellert (1976b). However, Kellert (1978) focuses
only on the portion (i.e., 37%) of the original dataset who
identified themselves as hunters (operationally defined as
"anyone who had hunted at any point in life, regardless of
reason or frequency") or anti-hunters. Furthermore, Kellert
(1978) employs the "attitudes towards animals" typology from
Kellert (1974) and Kellert (1976a) to describe hunters and
anti-hunters. However, the typology in Kellert (1978)
contains an additional scale, neutralism, which the
researcher defines as "a passive avoidance of animals due
either to indifference or lack of concern" and notes that
"in the original research analysis and in this paper the
neutralistic and negativistic attitudes are treated together
as a single attitude."
Much like Kellert (1976a), Kellert (1978) provides no
reliability coefficients for the overall "attitudes toward
animals" questionnaire nor for any of the individual
attitude scales. The researcher notes that "scales measuring
most of the attitude types were developed using such
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statistical techniques as cluster, multiple discriminant and
correlational analyses." However, the researcher provides no
statistical results from these analyses, nor does he report
re-running any of these analyses on the sub-sample data
(i.e., hunters and anti-hunters only) that are the focus of
the article.
Kellert (1979) describes the administration of a 65item "attitudes toward animals" questionnaire to a sample of
3,107 randomly selected adults in the United States. The
author claimed that "cluster and other correlational
analyses were employed" to construct eight "attitudes toward
animals" scales. However, the researcher provides no
statistical results from these analyses. The eight scales-naturalistic, ecologistic, humanistic, moralistic,
scientistic, utilitarian, dominionistic, and negativistic-were conceptually the same as their namesakes in Kellert
(1976a). In support of the claim that the eight scales were
independent, Kellert (1979) noted that correlations between
the scales were small, i.e. less than 0.4 in magnitude.
However, Kellert (1979) does not include the wording of the
items or the response options, does not specify the number
of response options, does not identify how many items are
included in each scale, and does not establish the extent to
which the same items are utilized in more than one scale.
Consequently, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions
from the interscale correlations reported in Kellert (1979).
Moreover, Kellert (1979) does not report any reliability
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coefficients for the overall "attitudes toward animals"
questionnaire nor for any of the individual attitude scales.
Kellert and Berry (1980) provides additional
information about the data and instrumentation first
described in Kellert (1979). For example, Kellert and Berry
(1980) specifies the number of items associated with each
"attitudes toward animals" scale; specifies the scoring
range for each scale; notes that each questionnaire item
required respondents to utilize a six-point, Likert-scale,
ranging from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree"; and
provides the exact wording of a small number of
questionnaire items, which are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Sample Items from "Attitudes toward Animals" Questionnaire in
Kellert and Berry (1980)
Attitude Scale

Questionnaire Item

Negativistic

I dislike most beetles and spiders.
I think rats and cockroaches should be eliminated.

Humanistic

I think love is an emotion which people should feel
only for other people, not for animals.
I have owned pets that were as dear to me as another
person.

Moralistic

I see nothing wrong with using steel traps to capture
wild animals.
Zoos should provide more natural conditions for their
animals even if this means much higher entrance fees.

Scientistic

I have little desire to study vertebrate zoology or
population genetics.
I have little interest in learning the taxonomic
classification of animals.

Utilitarian

A dog trained at a task, like herding sheep, is
generally a better dog than one owned just for
companionship.
I approve of building on marshes that ducks and other
non-endangered wildlife use if the marshes are needed
for housing development.

Dominionistic

I admire a person who works hard to shoot a big
trophy animal like a 600-pound bear.
I think a person sometimes has to beat a horse or dog
to get it to obey orders properly.

Kellert and Berry (1980) asserts that the eight scales "were
developed as a result of cluster and item-to-item
correlational analyses." However, the authors do not report
any of the statistics that resulted from these analyses.
Kellert (1980) was a recapitulation of Kellert (1979)
and Kellert and Berry (1980), utilizing the same data set
but reporting no additional information about the
construction or validation of the "attitudes toward animals"
questionnaire or its scales. Discussing the same dataset as
Kellert (1979), Kellert (1980), and Kellert and Berry
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(1980), Kellert (1993b) notes that "attitude scales were
constructed based on cluster and factor analyses that
identified 4-9 questions as measures of the underlying
attitude type" but does not provide any statistics from
these analyses. Kellert (1993b) also reports that each of
the "attitudes toward animals" scales yielded Cronbach’s
alpha values between 0.78 and 0.92.
Prior to 1983, all of Kellert’s work in the development
of an "attitudes toward animals" typology utilized adults as
subjects. In contrast, Kellert and Westervelt (1983) and
Kellert (1985) focused on children ages 6 to 18. As a
sample, this study utilized a group of 267 randomly selected
children who attended 16 randomly selected public schools in
Connecticut. After pre-testing potential "attitudes toward
animals" items with 50 children within the aforementioned
age range, the research team developed three versions of the
questionnaire: one version for administration to second
graders; a second version, for fifth and eighth graders; and
a third, for eleventh graders (Kellert and Westervelt,
1983).
From the questionnaire items, the research team
constructed eight "attitudes toward animals" scales. The
eight scales--naturalistic, ecologistic, humanistic,
moralistic, scientistic, utilitarian, dominionistic, and
negativistic--were conceptually the same as their namesakes
in Kellert (1976a), Kellert (1976b), and Kellert (1979).
However, the researchers do not supply any information
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regarding how questionnaire items were assigned to the
scales.
The exact number of items that appeared on the Kellert
and Westervelt (1983) questionnaire is unclear, as the
researchers did not provide a complete list of items in
their report. Moreover, regarding the number of items on the
questionnaire, the information in the Methodology section of
the Kellert and Westervelt (1983) report and in Kellert
(1985) is somewhat nebulous and incongruent. On pages 18-19
of the Kellert and Westervelt (1983) report, the authors
state:
... a number of methodologies, including a film test,
were designed to assess children’s attitudes toward
animals. Twenty-seven attitude questions were asked at
the beginning of the interview and 27 more after the
film was projected ... In order to determine the
presence and relative strength of the nine attitude
types, attitude scales were designed from the 54
attitude questions
However, on page 20, the authors state:
The film was shown to each child . . . and during projection interviewers administered an 87-item attitude
questionnaire ... Twenty-seven questions were included
in the attitude scales ... The remaining sixty items
served to focus attention on critical film segments,
stimulate reflection, and sustain interest in the film.
Finally, about the same study, Kellert (1985) states:
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Fifty-four questions were used for measuring the eight
attitude scales. Additionally, a thirty-minute film,
and an accompanying 87-item questionnaire, were created
to provide a less structured and more visually
sensitive test of animals toward animals.
While neither Kellert and Westervelt (1983) nor Kellert
(1985) specifies the number of items and the scoring ranges
associated with most of the "attitudes toward animals"
scales, Kellert and Westervelt (1983) does note that many of
the questionnaire items required respondents to utilize a
four-point, Likert-scale, ranging from "Strongly Agree" to
"Strongly Disagree." The researchers also provide the exact
wording of a small number of these items, which are shown in
Table 3.

Table 3
Sample Items from "Attitudes toward Animals"Questionnaire
(Four-Point Likert Scale) in Kellert and Westervelt (1983)
Attitude Scale
Negativistic
Naturalistic

Moralistic

Utilitarian
Dominionistic

Questionnaire Item
Most wild animals are dangerous to people.
I don’t like most animals close to me.
I like pet animals like dogs and cats more than I
like wild animals.
If I went camping, I would want to stay where lots
of other people were, not where wild animals were
around.
It’s OK to hunt whales for food as long as there are
a lot of them left in the world.
It’s OK to kill an animal and use its fur to make a
coat.
If they found oil where wild animals lived, we would
have to get the oil, even if it harmed the animals.
All dogs should be very strictly trained so they do
everything their owners tell them to do.
Sometimes people must beat a horse or dog hard to
make it do what they want.
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Unlike in Kellert (1976a), Kellert (1979), and Kellert
and Berry (1980), the "attitudes toward animals"
questionnaire discussed in Kellert and Westervelt (1983) and
Kellert (1985) was not exclusively comprised of Likert-scale
items. For example, some questionnaire items employed a twopoint, dichotomous scale, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4
Sample Items from "Attitudes toward Animals"Questionnaire
(Two-Point "Yes/No" Scale) in Kellert and Westervelt (1983)
Attitude Scale

Questionnaire Item

Ecologistic

Is it wrong for animals to kill and eat other animals?
Would it be better if animals didn’t kill other
animals and ate plants instead?

In other cases, subjects were asked to use a four-point
scale

to indicate the extent to which they "liked" (Liked a

Lot, Liked a Little, Disliked a Little, and Disliked a Lot)
viewing a segment of the film associated with a particular
"attitudes toward animals" subscale (Kellert and Westervelt,
1983). However, neither Kellert and Westervelt (1983) nor
Kellert (1985) provide any information regarding how scores
from different types of items were weighted and combined to
create scale scores for each respondent.
In support of the claim that the eight scales were
independent, Kellert and Westervelt (1983) and Kellert
(1985) noted that correlations between the scales were
small, i.e. less than 0.3 in magnitude in nearly all
instances. However, Kellert and Westervelt (1983) provides
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only limited information about the wording and response
options and does not establish the extent to which the same
items are utilized in more than one scale. Consequently, it
is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the
interscale correlations reported in Kellert and Westervelt
(1983). Moreover, neither Kellert and Westervelt (1983) nor
Kellert (1985) report any reliability coefficients for the
overall "attitudes toward animals" questionnaire or for any
of the individual attitude scales.
Kellert (1993c) describes the administration of an
"attitudes toward invertebrates" questionnaire to 214 adult
residents of Connecticut. The researchers report the development of eight scales (negativistic, aesthetic, utilitarian, ecologistic, naturalistic, scientistic, moralistic,
and humanistic) that, with the exception of the aesthetic
scale, were conceptually similar to their namesakes that
appear in earlier studies (Kellert, 1976a; Kellert, 1976b;
Kellert, 1979; Kellert and Berry, 1980; Kellert and Westervelt, 1983). Kellert (1993c) provides the first encountered
report of the successful development of a scale for aesthetic, which is defined as "Primary interest in the physical
attractiveness and symbolic appeal of invertebrates."
Kellert (1993c) notes that each scale contained 3-9
items, but the researcher does not reveal the exact number
of items on each scale nor the total number of items on the
"attitudes toward invertebrates" questionnaire. Similarly,
while Kellert (1993c) states that "the scales were

34

constructed based on cluster and factor analysis results"
and that "correlational findings indicated that the scales
were relatively independent of one another," the researcher
does not provide any statistics to support these assertions.
Finally, Kellert (1993c) does not report any reliability
coefficients for the overall "attitudes toward animals"
questionnaire or for any of the individual attitude scales.
Kellert’s Biophilic "Values" or "Tendencies" or "Dimensions"
Kellert first discusses biophilia in 1993 in an essay
entitled "The Biological Basis for Human Values of Nature"
that appears in the book The Biophilia Hypothesis (Kellert,
1993a). Kellert co-edited the book with Edward O. Wilson,
who early in the previous decade coined the term "biophilia"
and first attempted to define it (Wilson, 1984). In his
essay, Kellert defines biophilia as "a biologically based,
inherent human need to affiliate with life and lifelike
processes" and proposes that "the widest valuational
affiliation with life and lifelike processes (ecological
functions and structures, for example) has conferred
distinctive advantages in the human evolutionary struggle to
adapt, persist, and thrive as individuals and as a species."
Kellert purports the chapter’s purpose is to "[examine] nine
fundamental aspects of our species’ presumably biological
basis for valuing and affiliating with the natural world,"
which Kellert identifies as "utilitarian, naturalistic,
ecologistic-scientific, aesthetic, symbolic, humanistic,
moralistic, dominionistic, and negativistic valuations of
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nature."
However, Kellert (1993a) does not present the results
of any new empirical work as evidence of the existence of
his "nine hypothesized dimensions of the biophilic
tendency." Instead, Kellert (1993a) makes reference to more
than two-dozen prior studies that investigated "attitudes
toward animals," including Kellert (1976b), Kellert (1979),
Kellert & Berry (1981), Kellert (1985), Kellert (1993b), and
Kellert (1993c). Arguing in heavily qualified language that
the findings from these prior studies point to the existence
of biophilic values, Kellert (1993a) notes:
What began as merely the objective of describing
variation in people’s perceptions of animals gradually
emerged as the possibility of universal expressions of
basic human affinities for the natural world . . . [the
"attitudes toward animals" typology’s] occurrence . . .
in a wide variety of taxonomic, behavioral,
demographic, historic, and cultural contexts suggests
the distinct possibility that these categories might
very well be reflections of universal and functional
expressions of our species’ dependence on the natural
world.
Conceptually, the biophilic values described in this
chapter are similar to their "attitude toward animals"
namesakes identified in prior Kellert studies. However, in
Kellert (1993a), the ecologistic and scientistic attitudes
described in prior studies are consolidated in Kellert
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(1993a) into one biophilic value entitled "ecologisticscientific." According to Kellert (1993a), this change was
warranted on theoretical grounds because "both perspectives
similarly reflect the motivational urge for precise study
and systematic inquiry of the natural world and the related
belief that nature can be understood through empirical
study." Another significant difference between the
"attitudes toward animals" typology that appears in
Kellert’s previous work and biophilic values typology in
Kellert (1993a) is the addition of a new construct:
symbolic. Kellert notes that the symbolic value of nature is
reflected most clearly in the role that nature has played in
the development of human language.
Echoing the claims initially made in Kellert (1993a),
The Value of Life: Biological Diversity and Human Society
(Kellert, 1996) affirms the existence of biophilia as a
"deep biological need for affiliating with life and nature"
and the nine values identified in Kellert (1993a) as
"[reflective of] a range of physical, emotional, and
intellectual expressions of the biophilic tendency to
associate with nature." However, in what might be described
as a fairly obvious hedge, Kellert (1996) defines biophilic
values as "weak biological tendencies . . . requiring
learning and experience if they are to become stable and
consistently manifest . . . Learning and experience exert a
fundamental shaping influence on the content, direction, and
strength of these values. Without this reinforcement, the
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values may become vestigial and distorted." However, Kellert
(1996) is not an attempt at persuading readers that
biophilia and biophilic values are real phenomena. Their
existence is assumed. Rather, the central thesis of Kellert
(1996) is that loss of biodiversity on Earth may represent
"more . . . than just the diminution of people’s material
options [and] . . . might also signify the possibility of
diminished emotional and intellectual well-being and
capacity."
Like Kellert (1993a), Kellert (1996) presents the
results of no new empirical work but instead refers to the
results of previous studies (e.g., Kellert & Westervelt,
1983; Kellert, 1985). Additionally, Kellert (1996) claims
that "The development of this typology of basic values
facilitated the measurement of the American public’s
attitudes toward wildlife and its conservation," a statement
that reads like revisionist history to anyone familiar
enough with Kellert’s prior work to know that, in describing
this typology, the term "attitudes" is utilized extensively
and consistently by Kellert beginning in 1974 and the term
"values" did not appear in Kellert’s published work until
1993.
Entitled Kinship to Mastery: Biophilia in Human
Evolution and Development, Kellert (1997) reaffirms the
claims of Kellert’s prior works by asserting that
"expressions of biophilia represent, to varying degrees,
weak biological tendencies that are greatly dependent on
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learning, experience, and social support for their full and
functional realization." However, Kellert (1997) adds to the
conversation about biophilia by providing many examples of
how biophilia is expressed by humans individually and
collectively, as well as functionally and dysfunctionally.
Some examples of how, according to Kellert (1997), the
Naturalistic value is expressed appear in Table 5.

Table 5
Expressions of Biophilic Value of Naturalism in Kellert
(1997)
Functional

Dysfunctional

Individual

" . . . picking berries,
gathering mushrooms,
harvesting firewood,
digging clams, fishing or
hunting . . . pursuits
that reflect a passion for
extracting a portion of
our sustenance from the
land and its creatures."

Harvesting endangered or
threatened wild species

Collective

Commercial exploitation of
wild species to produce
food, medicine, clothing,
building materials, and so
on.

Commercial exploitation
of wild species to the
point of extinction or
ecosystem disruption,
"spurred by a view of
species as inexhaustible,
easily replaced by other
creatures, or irrelevant
because of presumed
future inventions and new
technology."

Kellert (1997) also provides examples of how biophilic
values are typically denied or suppressed in modern society.
For example, persons doubting the existence or importance of
naturalistic values often equate progress with "one’s
distance from--and control over--the natural world." Kellert
(1997) writes:
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The virtues of domesticating nature and transforming
natural landscapes were presumably proved by our
victories over hunger, disease, and scarcity. Western
civilization prided itself on food surpluses and
material affluence achieved through the mass production
of cultivated crops and the elimination of wild
competitors. Modern medicine achieved its ends by
controlling and eradicating other organisms; industrial
production and urbanization by subduing and
transforming natural habitats; contemporary agriculture
and forestry by creating enormous monocultures through
homogenizing and simplifying natural landscapes. These
"triumphs" of modern life required conquering wild
nature and confirmed a view of progress and
civilization as synonymous with controlling and
transforming natural diversity.
Like Kellert (1993a) and Kellert (1996), Kellert (1997)
presents the results of no new empirical work but instead
refers to the results of one previous study (i.e., Kellert,
1993c).
Kellert (2002) reiterates ideas expressed in Kellert
(1996) and Kellert (1997), affirming the existence of "a
typology of nine basic values of the natural world . . .
[that are] . . . thought to constitute ‘weak’ biological
tendencies or genetic inclinations to affiliate with natural
process and diversity and are collectively labeled
biophilia." Moreover, like Kellert (1997), Kellert (2002)
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asserts that "the insufficient and atrophied or the
exaggerated and inordinate expression of any of these values
is considered over the long-term dysfunctional and
maladaptive." However, unlike the aforementioned works,
Kellert (2002) focuses specifically on the importance of
biophilia in the personality and character development of
children. For example, Kellert (2002) claims:
. . . functional benefits stemming from [the
naturalistic] value include inclinations for
exploration, discovery, curiosity, inquisitiveness, and
imagination, enhanced self-confidence and self-esteem
by demonstrating competence and adaptability in nature,
and greater calm and coping capacities through
heightened temporal awareness and spatial involvement.
However, Kellert (2002) supports its claims about the
presence (and ages of emergence) of these biophilic values
in children by citing the results of cross-sectional surveys
that measured attitudes toward animals (Kellert &
Westervelt, 1983; Kellert, 1985) and theoretical work
(Kellert, 1996). Kellert (2002) presents the results of no
new empirical work.
Unlike Kellert (1993), Kellert (1996), Kellert (1997),
and Kellert (2002), Kellert (2005) reports the results of a
relatively recent data-collection effort. Specifically,
Kellert (2005) discusses a research project called the
"Mastodon Study," in which "information relevant to
measuring [biophilic] values . . . was obtained through a
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forty-five minute survey administered to more than two
thousand residents [of south-central Connecticut], through
observational data, and through secondary sources." Kellert
(2005) found a "strong relationship between environmental
quality, people’s [biophilic] values, and human physical and
mental well-being in various urban and nonurban
communities." However, Kellert (2005) did not report the
magnitude of these relationships nor provide any specific
information (e.g. the number and wording of survey items,
the biophilic value or values to which each item was
intended to correspond, the options available to respondents
on the survey response scale, and so on) regarding the
measurement of the biophilic values. Consequently, Kellert
(2005) did little to improve on past efforts or inform
future efforts to measure biophilia.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Kellert’s Work
Kellert’s typology of attitudes toward animals is
nothing short of a pioneering effort, a conceptual framework
that he developed from scratch (Kellert, 1974) and refined
over three decades, collecting data from thousands of
participants across multiple demographic groups (age,
gender, profession, and so on) and nationalities (Kellert,
1974; Kellert 1976a; Kellert, 1979; Kellert, 1993c; Kellert
& Berry, 1981; Kellert & Westervelt, 1983; Kellert, 2005).
Moreover, many of Kellert’s works discuss the distribution
of these attitudes across demographic groups, providing
limited convergent and discriminant evidence for the
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construct validity of his attitude typology.
Unfortunately, Kellert’s empirical studies suffer from
some serious methodological deficiencies. For example, none
of these studies report the extent to which Kellert’s
instruments are correlated with other measures of similar
constructs. Moreover, very few of the studies report the use
of advanced statistical methods (e.g., factor-analytic
techniques) to investigate the construct validity of the
attitudinal components in Kellert’s typology. To be sure,
this limitation is not unexpected since, at the time most of
this research was conducted (i.e., the 1970s and 1980s), the
equipment (i.e., computer hardware and software) and
expertise required to use such methods was much less common
than today. However, other methological gaps--e.g., missing
MFDA statistics in Kellert (1974); missing cluster analysis
statistics in Kellert (1976a); no clusters or correlational
analysis statistics in Kellert (1979); almost no reporting
of reliability coefficients; and so on--seem less excusable.
All of Kellert texts that discuss biophilia (Kellert,
1993a, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2005) assert that it consists of
multiple "values" (e.g., naturalism, moralism, humanism,
scientism, ecologism, negativism, and so on) that have led
people to affiliate with nature in ways that have enhanced
homo sapiens’ long-term viability. However, in nearly all
the Kellert texts that discuss biophilia (Kellert, 1993a,
1996, 1997, 2002), the empirical evidence utilized to
demonstrate the existence of biophilic values is actually
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data collected during prior studies (Kellert, 1974, 1976a,
1979, 1993c; Kellert & Berry, 1981; Kellert & Westervelt,
1983) that had a much more limited focus--i.e., the
measurement of attitudes toward animals only, excluding all
other organisms that might be considered "wildlife" and all
other phenomena that might be called "nature." (In fact,
only Kellert (2005) reports the collection of data
specifically focused on biophilic values. However, Kellert
(2005) provides almost no technical information regarding
how the data were collected or analyzed.) As a result,
claims that the prior studies substantiate the existence of
biophilic values are suspect; the instrumentation utilized
in those studies lacks sufficient content validity to
support such inferences.
In conclusion, Kellert’s contribution to the study of
people’s attitudes toward animals was thoroughly original,
was undeniably trailblazing, and was (in fact, still is)
unparalleled in scope. However, the reported results of his
data analyses were insufficient to support any but the
weakest of claims regarding the construct validity of his
typology of attitudes toward animals. Moreover, Kellert
overreaches when he utilizes the data from his "attitudes
toward animals" studies as evidence for the content validity
of his typology of biophilic values.
Other Scholars Using Kellert’s Typology
Kellert’s typology is often cited by scholars and
researchers in articles on environmental attitudes and
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biophilia (e.g., Plous, 1993; Ulrich, 1993; Nabhan & St.
Antoine, 1993; Nabhan, 1994; Kahn, 1999; Gullone, 2000;
Herzog & Dorr, 2000; Herzog, 2002; Drews, 2003; Myers &
Saunders, 2002; Knight, et al., 2003; Vollum, 2004; Mayer &
McPherson-Frantz, 2004; Lopez, et al., 2007; Knight, 2008).
Moreover, in the past decade, a small number of scholars
have conducted empirical studies that employed Kellert’s
typology (Drews, 2002; Thompson & Mintzes, 2002; Rauwald &
Moore, 2002; Barney et al., 2005; Lukas & Ross, 2005; Prokop
& Kubiatko, 2008).
Drews (2002) utilized a sample of 1021 adults and 177
children in Costa Rica to collect data for a 27-item, 4point, "attitudes toward animals" scale modeled after
Kellert and Berry (1981) but focusing on fauna found in
Costa Rica. Utilizing a principal components analysis with
an orthogonal rotation, Drews (2002) found and retained five
factors with eigenvalues ranging from 1.21 to 3.76.
Altogether, the five factors accounted for 39% of the
indicators’ variance. These factors were labeled
Inquisitive, Sentimental, Schematic, Materialistic, and
Ethical, and they corresponded (very roughly) to Kellert’s
Scientistic, Humanistic, Aesthetic, Utilitarian, and
Moralistic dimensions. Drews (2002) did not report factor
loadings for any of the items on his scale, nor did he
specify the minimum factor loading value utilized for
assignment of an item to a particular factor.
Thompson and Mintzes (2002) adapted Kellert’s typology
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to assess the attitudes of 120 college students toward
sharks. A principal components analysis with a varimax
rotation of Thompson and Mintzes’ five-point, 39-item scale
revealed four factors with eigenvalues exceeding 2.0. These
factors were labeled Utilitarian/Negative, Naturalistic,
Scientific, and Moralistic. Items with factor loadings of
0.45 or greater were assigned to a factor.
Rauwald and Moore (2002) administered a 27-item,
Kellert-like measure to 758 undergraduates at three
universities located in three different countries (Trinidad,
Dominican Republic, and the United States). Principal
components analysis7 revealed four factors
(Moralistic/Aesthetic, Dominionistic, Utilitarian, and
Humanistic) that together accounted for 39% to 45% of the
variance in the indicators8. Items with factor loadings of
0.41 or greater were assigned to a factor. For 21 of the
items, Rauwald and Moore utilized a ten-point response scale
that ranged from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree."
For the other 6 items, Rauwald and Moore employed a tenpoint response scale ranging from "being unimportant to you"
to "being very important to you personally."
Utilizing a convenience sample of 239 participants
ranging in age from 10 to 25, Barney et al. (2005) developed
a 39-item, 3-point, Kellert-like measure that focused
7

Rauwald and Moore (2002) does not specify the type of
rotation
utilized.
8
The percentage of variance (POV) range is specified here
because Rauwald and Moore (2002) reports POV values for each
country but not an overall POV value.
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specifically on attitudes toward dolphins. Principal
components analysis with a varimax rotation revealed three
factors, labeled Humanistic, Utilitarian, and Ecoscientific.
Items with factor loadings of 0.52 or greater were assigned
to a factor. However, Barney et al. (2005) does not report
the percentage of variance explained by any of the factors,
eigenvalues for any of the factors, or results from
examinations of scree plots.
The 28-item, six-point (from "strongly agree" to
"strongly disagree"), Kellert-like scale in Lukas and Ross
(2005) was administered to 1000 visitors to the ape facility
at a metropolitan zoo in the United States and focused
exclusively on attitudes toward gorillas and chimpanzees. A
factor analysis with a varimax rotation revealed six
factors, which were labeled Naturalistic, Ecoscientistic,
Moralistic, Negativistic, Utilitarian, and Dominionistic.
Items with factor loadings of 0.53 or greater were assigned
to a factor. However, Lukas and Ross (2005) does not report
the percentage of variance explained by any of the factors,
eigenvalues for any of the factors, or results from
examinations of scree plots.
Utilizing a sample of 462 participants in Slovokia,
Prokop and Kubiatko (2008) developed a 30-item, five-point
(from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree"), Kellert-like
scale that focused on children’s attitudes toward predators
and prey (specifically, wolves and rabbits). A factor
analysis with an orthogonal rotation revealed three factors,
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labeled Scientific, Ecologistic, and Myths about parental
care. These three factors had eigenvalues of 4.28, 1.7, and
1.3, respectively. Items with factor loadings of 0.38 or
greater were assigned to a factor. However, Prokop and
Kubiatko do not report the percentage of variance for which
any of the factors account.
The six aforementioned studies (Thompson & Mintzes,
2002; Rauwald & Moore, 2002; Drews, 2002; Lucas & Ross,
2005; Barney et al., 2005; and Prokop & Kubiatko, 2008)
represent a new stage in the development of Kellert-typology
measures in several ways. First, these "neo-Kellert" studies
exhibit a higher level of methodological sophistication than
most of Kellert’s own work. As noted repeatedly in earlier
sections of this chapter, Kellert’s publications often did
not report the values of key statistical tests (e.g.,
reliability coefficients) typically utilized in instrumentdevelopment-and-validation studies. Moreover, Kellert rarely
utilized factor-analytic tests or any other established
techniques for evaluating the dimensionality of his
measures. In contrast, as shown in Table 6, the use of
advanced statistical methods and reporting of technical
information and test values was fairly common (although not
consistent or universal) in the neo-Kellert studies.
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Table 6
Neo-Kellert Studies Published Since 2000
Utilized
FactorAnalytic
Techniques

Reported
Eigenvalues

Reported
POV

Reported
Minimum
Factor
Loadings

Reported
Cronbach’s
Alpha

Reported Item
Wording

Thompson &
Mintzes
(2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Rauwald
& Moore
(2002)

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Drews
(2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Lukas &
Ross
(2005)

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Barney
et al.
(2005)

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Prokop &
Kubiatko
(2008)

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Kellert frequently claimed that peoples’ attitudes toward
animals (and later biophilic values toward nature) were
multidimensional. However, in most of Kellert’s published
studies, the results of statistical tests that would support
such assertions about dimensionality went unreported or
underreported. For example, as previously mentioned, the
description of the multiple discriminant function analysis
(MFDA) procedure that led Kellert to devise his typology of
attitudes toward animals (Kellert, 1974) failed to report
several key values that most researchers consider critical
for determining the results of that type of statistical
test. Similarly, Kellert (1976a), Kellert (1976b), Kellert
(1978), Kellert (1979), Kellert and Berry (1980), Kellert
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(1993b), and Kellert (1993c) report that the results of
advanced statistical procedures (specifically, MFDA and/or
cluster analysis) supported the dimensionality of Kellert’s
typology. However, none of these publications provide
technical information about these results. Thus, the studies
summarized in Table 6 represent the first technically
sophisticated and reasonably transparent attempts to examine
the dimensionality of Kellert’s typology.
Another way that the neo-Kellert studies are a
significant departure from Kellert’s work is that most of
the former are narrower in focus. Whereas most of Kellert’s
empirical work examined the attitudes toward animals in
general9, nearly all the neo-Kellert studies target regional
(e.g., Costa Rica) fauna or specific species (e.g., sharks,
dolphins, gorilla and chimpanzees). However, the term
"biophilia" does not appear in any of the neo-Kellert
studies, even those that cite Kellert (1996). In fact, just
one of the neo-Kellert studies (i.e., Rauwald & Moore, 2002)
makes an indirect and superficial reference to the notion of
biophilia, noting "Kellert believed that his measures of
attitudes, knowledge, and behaviors toward animals are a
9

Kellert (1993c) and Kellert (1999) are exceptions. Kellert
(1993c) attempted to measure attitudes toward invertebrates.
Kellert (1999) included 94 “attitude” questions and focused
exclusively on marine mammals. However, Kellert (1999)
proposed no typology of attitudes. Additionally, Kellert
(1999) states, “Scales were also developed to allow
comparisons of broad views of marine mammals and their
management among varying groups. Factor analysis techniques
were used to cluster questions for scaling purposes.”
However, Kellert (1999) provides no results or statistics
from the aforementioned factor analytic tests.
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reflection of the relationship between humans and nature."
Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that the authors
of the neo-Kellert studies were not champions of the
biophilia hypothesis.
One interesting finding that appears across all the
neo-Kellert studies is that the dimensionality of Kellert’s
typology is never confirmed. None of the neo-Kellert studies
revealed more than six factors, whereas Kellert’s original
typology consisted of no less than seven (cf., Kellert,
1974) and up to ten (cf., Kellert, 1978) attitude types,
with most Kellert studies finding eight attitude types (cf.,
Kellert, 1979; Kellert & Berry, 1980; Kellert & Westervelt,
1983; Kellert, 1985; Kellert, 2005). However, it is
difficult to draw firm conclusions from this observed lack
of confirmation, as the neo-Kellert studies are few in
number, utilize samples from very different populations,
focus on different fauna, and vary in terms of
methodological quality. For example, Rauwald and Moore
(2002) utilizes one response scale for 21 (88%) of their
instrument’s items and another response scale for six (22%)
of its items. Interestingly, all six of the items that
loaded on the Moralistic/Aesthetic factor utilized the
latter response, while the 21 items that loaded on the other
three factors utilized the former scale. Consequently, it is
not hard to assert that the Moralistic/Aesthetic factor
found in Rauwald and Moore is not at least partially a
methodological artifact.

51

Related Constructs
Interest in environmental preservation is a construct
related to biophilia and has been characterized as having
two facets: ecocentrism and anthropocentrism (GagnonThompson & Barton). Persons with an ecocentric (or
biospheric, in the language of Schultz et. al., 2001, 2004,
2005) interest in environmental preservation believe that
nature has inherent, self-evident value. All species and
their habitats deserve protection, even when providing this
protection is disadvantageous or inconvenient to humans.
Ecocentric persons would agree with Nash’s (1991) assertion
that “nonhuman organisms—animals and plants—are more than a
means to others’ ends; they are ends for themselves.”
Consequently, a person exhibiting high levels of ecocentrism
would be very supportive of efforts to protect the Devil's
Hole pupfish, a species of inch-long fish that live in only
one place (an underground cavern in Pahrump, Nevada) and
whose population consists of just several hundred
individuals. To an ecocentric person, it would not matter if
pupfish met all or none of the standards of value that
humans often place on other species. The mere fact that the
pupfish is alive makes it worthy of some reasonable amount
of protection.
In contrast, persons whose interest in preserving the
environment is anthropocentric (i.e., persons who value
nature only to the extent to which it enhances human quality
of life) would likely see efforts to protect the pupfish as
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a waste of time and effort unless a strong argument could be
made that extinction of the pupfish would be an cataclysmic
event that would reverberate through the rest of the
ecosystem and negatively affect humans. To the
anthropocentric person, nature is a frenemy that deserves
protection, but only in those cases when nature’s interests
align with those of humanity. Likewise, nature merits little
or no consideration when its preservation threatens to
impede human activity. For example, an anthropocentric
preservationist might strongly endorse measures safeguarding
a river that supplies local drinking water but energetically
oppose efforts to protect an adjacent wetland upon which a
multinational corporation wishes to build a factory that
might eventually employ hundreds of local residents.
Anthropocentric interest in environmental preservation
can be further subdivided into two sub-facets: egoism and
altruism (Schultz, et. al., 2001, 2004, 2005). Persons with
an egoistic interest in the environment are most concerned
about environmental protection when their own personal
interests are at stake. For example, a egoistic Las Vegas,
Nevada, resident may be very worried about the environmental
impact of storing high-level nuclear waste in dry casks at
Yucca Mountain, which is just 90 miles north of the city,
but not remotely concerned about the hazards associated with
storing that waste in West Virginia or continuing to store
it at the power plants where it is produced. (Egoistic
persons are well-represented in every NIMBY protest
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movement.) Persons with an altruistic interest in the
environment take the concerns of other persons into account
when considering environmental issues, especially when they
know or feel connected in some way to those other persons.
Nevertheless, even the altruistic still place human
interests above those of the natural world. For example,
while an altruistic person might decry air pollution no
matter where it occurs because it causes respiratory
problems in humans but be relatively unconcerned about the
effect of light pollution on the survival of inconspicuous
nocturnal species.
The opposite of environmental preservation interest is
environmental apathy (Gagnon-Thompson & Barton). The
apathetic are strongly indifferent to the natural world and
deeply skeptical of all claims that human activity creates
ecological problems that require attention and remediation.
Among this group are persons who declare as proof of global
warming's non-existence every small piece of meteorological
information that does not neatly fit into their
understanding of human-induced climate change theory.
It is important to note that few people would serve as
perfect representations of any of the above constructs.
Rather, on some environmental issues, a given person may be
very ecocentric while on others, more anthropocentric (or
even apathetic). Thus, it would probably be more accurate to
say that these constructs represent end points on a
multidimensional continuum of environmental concern, with

54

individuals best characterized according to their proximity
to or distance from each of these endpoints across a variety
of environmental issues.
The degree to which a person feels interest (ecocentric
or anthropocentric) or apathy toward the environment and its
preservation may be a function of the extent to which he or
she subscribes to the New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap et.
al., 2000; Dunlap, 2008). In the 1970s, Dunlap identified
what he called the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) and noted
that it challenged what other scholars (i.e., Pirages and
Ehrlich) described as the dominant social paradigm (DSP) of
American culture at that time. This DSP included, “a
commitment to individualism and laissez-faire government . .
. [as well as] beliefs in progress, material abundance and
the goodness of growth; faith in the efficacy of science and
technology; and a view of nature as something to be subdued”
(Dunlap, 2008). The NEP, in contrast, focuses on the perils
of unregulated growth in human societies, the fragility of
natural ecosystems, and rejection of the view that nature
exist solely for human consumption. Consequently, an NEP
subscriber would likely be ecocentric in terms of his or her
interest in environmental preservation. On the other hand, a
person whose attitudes are shaped primarily by the
aforementioned DSP would more than likely be anthropocentric
or even apathetic regarding environmental preservation.
Mayer and McPherson Frantz (2004) define the construct
nature connectedness as the extent to people “view
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themselves as egalitarian members of the broader natural
community; feel a sense of kinship with it; view themselves
as belonging to the natural world as much as it belongs to
them ...” Consequently, nature connectedness is like
ecocentrism but much more intense, emphasizing not only
equivalence between the needs of humans and non-humans but
also a strong emotional link between humans and other
species. Nature-relatedness, on the other hand, focuses on a
deep understanding and appreciation for all aspects of the
natural world, even those that humans often find revolting
(Nisbet, 2008).
Instruments associated with each of these related
constructs are described in Chapter 3 of this dissertation
and are utilized as part of this effort to validate the BAI.
The expected relationships between these related con-structs
and the BAI dimensions are noted in Tables 7 and 8.
Practical Implications of this Literature Review
Over the course of this literature review, it has been
established that:
1) While many scholars have identified specific
phenomena that they claim are evidence of the
existence of biophilia, only Stephen Kellert has
attempted to create instrumentation to measure this
construct. The scope of Kellert’s work is vast in
terms of the size and range of the populations from
which he collected data, the number of occasions
during which he collected data, and the number of
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years over which he collected data.
2) Kellert’s instrumentation does not completely
address the construct that he claims it measures.
Specifically, the items on Kellert’s instruments
focus on animals and omit other life forms and
natural phenomena. The work of other researchers who
have developed Kellert-like scales (Thompson &
Mintzes, 2002; Rauwald & Moore, 2002; Drews, 2002;
Lukas & Ross, 2005; Barney et al., 2005; Prokop &
Kubiatko, 2008) suffers from the same limitation.
3) In the literature, there is insufficient information
about the data-analytic procedures that Kellert utilized in establishing his typology. Thus, his claims
regarding the typology’s dimensionality are suspect.
4) Studies conducted by other researchers attempting to
develop Kellert-like scales (Thompson & Mintzes,
2002; Rauwald & Moore, 2002; Drews, 2002; Lukas &
Ross, 2005; Barney et al., 2005; Prokop & Kubiatko,
2008) have been more technically sophisticated and
informative than Kellert’s work. The results of
these studies have not supported the dimensionality
of Kellert’s typology as proposed by Kellert
himself. However, due to the relatively small number
of these studies, it is probably premature to
abandon efforts to find empirical support for the
Kellert typology.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to:
1) Develop a Kellert-like instrument that fully
represents the construct biophilia (i.e., focuses
not just on animals but also on plant life and other
natural phenomena). This instrument will be called
the Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI).
2) Utilize appropriate data-analytic procedures to
investigate the BAI’s dimensionality.
3) Collect convergent and discriminant evidence for the
BAI’s validity by examining the extent to which the
BAI correlates with well-established measures of
environmental attitudes.
Research Questions
The research questions addressed in this study are:
1) Can a reliable, stable, and valid measure of
biophilic attitudes be developed?
2) If so, what would be the dimensionality of this
measure (i.e., the BAI)?
3) Will the instrument’s (i.e, the BAI’s) dimensionality confirm or fail to confirm Kellert’s typology?
4) If Kellert’s typology is not confirmed, how might
biophilia be reconceptualized based on the results
of the data analysis conducted in this study?
5) Does the instrument and/or its respective subscales
correlate in expected ways with other wellestablished measures of environmental attitudes?
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Hypotheses
I will compare two hypotheses which I refer to as the
full-model and reduced-model hypothesis.

The former

hypothesis states that biophilia, as measured by the BAI,
includes seven dimensions.

The latter hypothesis states

that biophilia has two dimensions.
The full-model hypothesis in this study is:
1)

Biophilia, as measured by the BAI, has seven
dimensions:
a) Dominionism (DOM), i.e., nature is meant to
challenge humans and be mastered by humans;
b) Ecologism/Scientism (E/S), i.e., nature is an
intriguing system of interdependence among
species and natural habitats, as well as a
fascinating object of study;
c) Humanism (HUM), i.e., nature provides humans
with opportunities to fulfill emotional needs
for bonding, intimacy, and companionship;
d) Moralism (MO), i.e., the natural world and its
non-human inhabitants have moral standing and
thus should not be exploited or abused;
e) Naturalism (NAT),i.e., direct contact with
nature, especially in unadulterated milieus,
provides humans with emotional satisfaction;
f) Negativism (NEG), i.e., nature is uncomfortable,
disgusting, and/or dangerous; and
g) Utilitarianism (UTI), i.e., nature is merely or
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primarily a resource for humans to utilize.
2)

If the seven-dimension structure of BAI is confirmed, the BAI subscales will correlate significantly with other measures of environmental attitudes, which are described in Chapter 3, in the
directions described in Table 7.
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Table 7
Predicted Correlations under Full-Model Hypothesis
between BAI Subscales and Other Measures
BAI
DOM

BAI
E/S

EAEAS10-Ecocentric

-

+

EAEAS-Anthropocentric

+

Scale-Subscale

-

EMS-Altruistic

+

BAI
NAT

+

+

BAI
NEG

-

-

+

+

+
+

+

+

-

-

+

+

-

-

-

-

-

+

CNS13

-

+

+

+

+

-

+

-

RNEPS12

NRS14-Self

BAI
UTI
-

+

EMS-Egoistic

NRS-Perspective

BAI
MOR

-

EAEAS-Apathy
EMS11-Biospheric

BAI
HUM

+

NRS-Experience

+
+

-

+

+

-

SRAN-Part 1

+

+

+

-

SRAN-Part 2

+

+

+

-

-

The reduced-model hypothesis in this study is:
1)

Biophilia, as measured by the BAI, has two
dimensions:
a) Biophilia, i.e., nature is beneficial to the
intellectual and emotional development of humans
and deserves to be held in high regard.
b) Biophobia, i.e., nature is frequently a
nuisance, obstacle, or threat to humans, having

10

Ecocentric/Anthropocentric/Environmental Apathy Scale
(EAEAS)
11
Environmental Motives Scale (EMS)
12
New Ecological Paradigm Scale (RNEPS)
13
Connectedness to Nature Scale (CNS)
14
Nature Relatedness Scale (NRS)
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value only to the extent it can be controlled
and thus exploited.
In this scenario, BAI items previously associated
with Ecologism, Humanism, Moralism, Naturalism, and
Scientism will load on Biophilia. BAI items
previously associated with Dominionism, Negativism,
and Utilitarianism will load on Biophobia.
2)

In the two-dimension structure (i.e., Biophilia and
Biophobia), the Biophilia and Biophobia subscales
will correlate significantly with other measures of
environmental attitudes in the directions described
in Table 8.
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Table 8
Predicted Correlations under Reduced-Model Hypothesis
between BAI Subscales and Other Measures
BAI
Biophilia

BAI
Biophobia

+

-

EAEAS-Apathy

-

+

EMS-Biospheric

+

-

EMS-Egoistic

-

+

RNEPS

+

-

CNS

+

-

NRS-Self

+

-

NRS-Perspective

+

-

NRS-Experience

+

-

SRAN-Part 1

+

-

SRAN-Part 2

+

-

Scale-Subscale
EAEAS-Ecocentric
EAEAS-Anthropocentric

EMS-Altruistic

This study will test the hypothesis that biophilia, as
measured by the BAI, is seven-dimensional construct because
historically Kellert and his disciples have always discussed biophilia in terms of seven or more categories of
attitudes or values. Consequently, it is necessary and appropriate, when attempting to validate any Kellert-inspired
instrument, to test the goodness of fit between the:


Predicted item interrelationships in a seven-factor
model based on Kellert; and



Actual observed item interrelationships that emerge from
data collected using the instrument.
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However, this study will also test the hypothesis that
biophilia, as measured by the BAI, is a two-dimensional
construct because a smaller number of factors is likely to
produce a more parsimonious (and perhaps more interpretable)
model. For purposes of testing the reduced-model hypothesis,
the items associated with Humanism, Ecologism/Scientism,
Moralism, Naturalism will be considered indicators of
biophilia and the indicators associated with Negativism,
Utilitarianism, and Dominionism will be considered
indicators of biophobia. This regrouping of indicators makes
sense since, as previously noted, Orr (1993) described
biophobia as a tendency among civilized humans to view the
natural world without empathy, to consider the presence of
other life forms solely in terms how they advanced or
impeded human interests and/or how they submitted to or
resisted human control.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION

Participants
The participants in this study (n=334)15 were Fall 2010
students from the UNLV Department of Educational Psychology’s research-subject pool. Ninety-five participants
(28.4%) were male; 239 (71.6%), female. The participants
ranged in age from 18 to 53, with a mean age of 25.6 and a
standard deviation of 6.7.
In terms of ethnicity, 239 participants (71.6%) were
white; 22 (6.6%), African American; 22 (6.6%), Asian; 5
(1.5%), American Indian or Alaskan Native; 8 (2.5%), Native
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; and 16 (4.8%), multi-racial.
Twenty-two participants (6.6%) did not disclose their
ethnicities. Sixty participants (18%) were Hispanic or
Latino; 271 (81.1%) were not Hispanic or Latino. Three
participants (0.9%) provided no response to the
Hispanic/Latino status question.
Materials
The principal instrument in this study was the author’s
Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI). Other materials,
15

Confirmatory factor-analytic procedures generally require
a subject-to-observed-indicator ratio of no less than 3:1
(Kline, 2005). Consequently, to utilize such procedures to
examine the factor structure of the BAI will require at
least 144 subjects or participants.
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utilized for investigating the BAI’s convergent and
discriminant validity, included:


Gagnon-Thompson and Barton’s (1994) Ecocentric/
Anthropocentric/Environmental Apathy Scale (EAEAS);



Schultz’s (2000) Environmental Motives Scale (EMS);



Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, and Jones’ (2000) Revised
New Ecological Paradigm Scale (RNEPS);



Mayer and McPherson-Frantz’s (2004) Connectedness to
Nature Scale (CNS);



Nisbet, Zelenski, and Murphy’s (2008) Nature
Relatedness Scale (NRS); and



Survey of Recreational Activities in Nature (SRAN)

BAI is a 48-item scale that I predict will assess the
extent to which the respondent exhibits biophilic attitudes
in seven dimensions: Dominionism, Ecologism/Scientism,
Humanism, Moralism, Naturalism, Negativism, and Utilitarianism. To complete the BAI, respondents will utilize a
five-point Likert-type scale--with response options ranging
from "(1) Strongly disagree" to "(5) Strongly agree"--to
signal their level of agreement with declarative statements
such as "I like the sound of rivers, streams, and washes." I
developed the BAI items after carefully examining all the
published attitudinal items that Kellert and his disciples
utilized--including 24 items from Kellert (1974); 67 items
from the “National Study Questionnaire” in Kellert (1976a);
152 items from the “Pilot Study Questionnaire” in Kellert
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(1976a); 57 items from Kellert (1999); 27 items from Drews
(2002); 39 items from Thompson and Mintzes (2002); 60 items
from Barney, et. al. (2005); 28 items from Lukas and Ross
(2005); and 30 items from Prokop and Kubiatko (2008). As
shown in Table A.1, almost none of the BAI items are
verbatim from the work of Kellert or any other scholar, as
the focus, format, and specific wording of published item
stems and response categories vary considerably from one
study to another. Consequently, I utilized the items created
by Kellert and others mostly as a content mine, extracting
from them ideas useful in the development of a uniform set
of BAI items.
After constructing an initial set of BAI items, I
collected feedback from several persons16 knowledgeable about
environmental attitudes and education, soliciting their
comments regarding both the clarity of the BAI items and the
extent to which the items were effective indicators of the
biophilic attitudes with which I associated them. I repeated
this process after several revisions of the BAI items. The
purpose of seeking such feedback was to increase the
likelihood that the final instrument would exhibit clarity
and conciseness and would not suffer from construct
underrepresentation (AERA, APA, & NCME, 1999; Furr &
Bacharach, 2008).

Taking the feedback of these

16

Daphne Sewing, Project Manager, Forever Earth/Outdoor
World, UNLV Public Lands Institute; Michele Weibel, Graduate
Assistant, UNLV Public Lands Institute; Dr. Gregg Schraw,
Program Evaluator, UNLV Public Lands Institute
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knowledgeable persons into account, I eliminated numerous
potential items and arrived at the set that appears in
Figure A.1 and Table A.1.
EAEAS (Gagnon-Thompson & Barton, 1994) is a 33-item
scale that assesses the extent to which the respondent
exhibits ecocentric attitudes toward nature (i.e.,
"appreciating nature for its own sake, positive affect and
stress reduction associated with nature, and seeing
connectedness between humans and animals"), anthropocentric
attitudes toward nature (i.e., "valuing nature because of
the material or physical benefits it can provide to
humans"), and apathy toward nature (i.e., "lack of interest
in environmental issues, and a general belief that problems
in this area have been exaggerated."). To complete the
EAEAS, respondents utilize a five-point Likert-type scale-with response options ranging from "(1) Strongly disagree"
to "(5) Strongly agree" to signal their level of agreement
with declarative statements such as "I prefer wildlife
preserves to zoos."
No published studies have reported the results of
factor-analytic procedures performed with data collected
using the EAEAS. However, low correlations (i.e., from 0.03
to 0.19 in magnitude) between the Ecocentric and
Anthropocentric subscales, low-to-modest correlations (i.e.,
0.18 to 0.37 in magnitude) between the Anthropocentric and
Apathy subscales, and large-but-inverse correlations (i.e.,
-0.48 to -0.61) between the Ecocentric and Apathy subscales

68

(Gagnon-Thompson & Barton, 1994; Casey & Scott, 2006)
suggest that the EAEAS may exhibit a three-factor structure.
Reported reliabilities17 for the EAEAS’ Ecocentric and
Anthropocentric subscales have ranged between 0.73 and 0.81
and between 0.67 and 0.74, respectively (Gagnon-Thompson &
Barton, 1994; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Casey & Scott, 2006).
Reported reliabilities for the Apathy subscale are 0.82
(Gagnon-Thompson & Barton, 1994; Casey & Scott, 2006).
EMS (Schultz, 2000) is a 12-item scale that measures
the extent to which a respondent’s concern for the
environment is egoistic (i.e., motivated by self interest),
altruistic (i.e., motivated by concern for other people),
and/or biospheric (i.e., motivated by concern for other
living things). Each EMS item begins with the words "I am
concerned about environmental problems because of the
consequences for ..." and is completed by one of the
following 12 words or phrases: animals, plants, marine life,
birds, me, my future, my lifestyle, my health, all people,
children, people in my community, and my children. To
complete each EMS item, respondents utilize a seven-point
Likert-type scale, with response options ranging from "(1)
Not important" to "(7) Supreme importance."

17

The conventional wisdom among researchers is that a
minimum reliability coefficient of 0.7 is acceptable and 0.8
or above is desirable for purposes of scale or subscale
development (Bernardi, 1994). However, as Knapp and Brown
(1995) note, there is no definitive rule or undisputed
standard regarding minimum reliability coefficients.
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Utilizing factor-analytic procedures, Schultz (2000),
Schultz (2001), and Schultz, et al. (2004) found three EMS
factors: Egoistic, Altruistic, and Biospheric. In Schultz
(2000), a principal-components analysis revealed these three
factors accounted for 74% of the variance in the EMS
indicators. Likewise, in Schultz, et al. (2004), principal
axis analyses on data collected from two separate samples
revealed the three factors explained between 66% and 68% of
the variance in EMS indicators. In Schultz (2000), Schultz
(2001), and Schultz, et al. (2005), confirmatory factor
analyses testing one-factor, two-factor, and three-factor
models, best fit was exhibited by the three-factor models.
Reported reliabilities for the EMS’ Egoistic,
Altruistic, and Biospheric subscales have ranged between
0.60 and 0.93, 0.61 and 0.91, and 0.73 and 0.95, respecttively (Schultz, 2000; Schultz, 2001; Schultz, et al., 2004;
Mayer & McPherson-Frantz, 2004; Schultz, et al., 2005).
RNEPS (Dunlap, et al., 2000) is a 15-item scale that
measures respondents’ "‘primitive beliefs’ about the nature
of the earth and humanity’s relationship with it."
Specifically, RNEPS items focus on beliefs in five areas:
humanity’s ability to upset nature’s balance, the existence
of limits to growth for human societies, humanity’s right to
dominate nature, humanity’s unique exemption from the
constraints of nature, and the probability of an ecological
crisis. To complete the RNEPS, respondents utilize a fivepoint, Likert-type scale--with response options ranging from
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"Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree" to signal their
level of agreement with declarative statements such as "The
balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts
of modern industrial nations."
Five published studies have investigated RNEPS’ dimensionnality by utilizing factor-analytic techniques. Four of
those studies (Dunlap, et al., 2000; Hunter & Rinner, 2003;
Rideout, et al., 2005; Willis & DeKay, 2007) found only one
major RNEPS factor. However, in Zografos and Allcroft
(2007), a principal components analysis revealed a fourfactor structure that replicated two of Dunlap’s "belief"
areas (specifically, the three RNEPS items addressing
"humanity’s right to dominate nature" and the three items
addressing "existence of limits to growth for human
societies.") The other two factors that Zografos and
Allcroft (2007) found subsume the remaining RNEPS items.
Still, because the majority of studies have not found RNEPS
to have more than one factor, RNEPS is treated as onedimensional for purposes of this dissertation. Reliability
coefficients for the RNEPS appear in Table 9.
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Table 9
Reported Reliability Coefficients for the Revised New
Ecological Paradigm Scale (RNEPS)
Study

Reliability

Dunlap, et al. (2000)

0.83

Cordano, et al. (2003)

0.79

Hunter & Rinner (2003)

0.87

Mayer & McPherson-Frantz (2004)

0.72 to 0.79

Schultz, et al. (2004)

0.78 to 0.94

Rideout, et al. (2005)

0.82 to 0.83

18

Schultz, et al. (2005)

0.56 to 0.74

Casey & Scott (2006)

0.84

Willis & DeKay (2007)

0.89

Nisbet, et al. (2008)

0.75

CNS (Mayer & McPherson-Frantz, 2004) is a 14-item scale
that measures ". . . an individual’s affective, experiential
connection to nature."

The CNS is based conceptually on the

work of naturalist Aldo Leopold, who contended that
motivation to address environmental issues depends on how
much:
. . . people experientially view themselves as
egalitarian members of the broader natural community;
feel a sense of kinship with it; view themselves as
belonging to the natural world as much as it belongs to
them; and view their welfare as related to the welfare
of the natural world. (Mayer & McPherson-Frantz, 2004)
18

Schultz, et al. (2005) collected data from samples
representing six different countries (Brazil, Czech
Republic, Germany, India, New Zealand, and Russia),
utilizing translated versions of the RNEP. The lower
reliability coefficients (i.e., < 0.7) produced by some of
these samples were consistent with earlier RNEP studies
which “yielded low reliabilities for translated versions.”
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To complete the CNS, respondents utilize a five-point,
Likert-type scale--with response options ranging from
"Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree" to signal their
level of agreement with declarative statements such as "Like
a tree can be part of a forest, I feel embedded within the
broader natural world."
Utilizing factor-analytic techniques to examine data
collected from five different samples on five different occasions, Mayer and McPherson-Frantz (2004) found the CNS to
be a one-dimensional instrument. Reported reliabilities for
the CNS have ranged from 0.79 to 0.91 (Mayer & McPhersonFrantz, 2004; Frantz, et al., 2005; Mayer, et al., 2008).
NRS (Nisbet, et al., 2008) is a 21-item scale that
measures, like CNS, measures an individual "level of
connectedness to the natural world." However, according to
NRS’ developers, the NRS differs from the CNS in that the
latter "misses the physical aspect of human-nature
relationships, a key element of individual sense of
connectedness." To complete the NRS, respondents utilize a
five-point, Likert-type scale--with response options ranging
from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree" to signal their
level of agreement with declarative statements such as "Even
in the middle of the city, I notice nature around me."
An exploratory factor analysis of NRS data revealed
three factors that Nisbet et al. (2008) labeled Self,
Perspective, and Experience. According the Nisbet et al.
(2008), the Self factor represents "an internalized
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identification with nature, reflecting feelings and thoughts
about one’s personal connection to nature"; the Perspective
factor, an "external, nature-related worldview, a sense of
agency concerning individual human actions and their impact
on all living things"; and Experience, "a physical
familiarity with the natural world, the level of comfort
with and desire to be out in nature."
Reported reliabilities for the NRS have ranged from
0.85 to 0.87 (Nisbet & Zelenski, 2004; Nisbet, et al., 2008)
and between 0.81 and 0.84, 0.65 and 0.66, and 0.80 and 0.85
for the Self, Perspective, and Experience subscales,
respectively (Nisbet, et., al., 2008).
Table 10 provides a brief summary of information about
the EAEAS, EMS, RNEPS, CNS, and NRS.
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Table 10
Summary of Information About Established Measures Utilized
to Examine BAI’s Convergent and Discriminant Validity
Measure No. of
Dimensions

Construct(s)
Measured

Reliability

Predicted Relationships to
the BAI19 Under
Full-model

EAEAS

EMS

3

3

Reduced
model

1)Ecocentrism

0.730.81

+E/S, +MOR,
+NAT, -DOM,
-UTI

+PHI
-PHO

2)Anthropocentrism;

0.670.74

+DOM, +UTI
-MOR

+PHO
-PHI

3)Environmental
Apathy

0.82

+NEG, -E/S
-HUM

+PHO
-PH

1)Egoism

0.600.93

+NEG, -E/S
-MOR

+PHO
-PHI

2)Altruism

0.610.91

+DOM, +HUM
+UTI

3)Biospherism

0.730.95

+E/S, +HUM,
+MOR, +NAT,
-DOM, -NEG

+PHI
-PHO

RNEPS

1

"Primitive"
Ecological
Beliefs

0.560.94

+E/S, +MOR,
-DOM, -NEG,
-UTI

+PHI
-PHO

CNS

1

Affective
connection to
nature

0.790.91

+E/S
+HUM
+NAT

+PHI
-PHO

NRS

3

1)Self

0.810.84

+E/S, +HUM,
+MOR, -NEG

+PHI
-PHO

2)Perspective

0.650.66

+E/S, +MOR,
-DOM, -NEG,
-UTI

+PHI
-PHO

3)Experience

0.800.85

+NAT
-NEG

+PHI
-PHO

Part 1 of the 22-item Survey of Recreational Activities
in Nature (SRAN) asks respondents to report how many times
in the past 12 months they participated in eleven common,

19

Under the full-model hypothesis, BAI subscales include
Dominionism (DOM), Ecologism/Scientism (E/S), Humanism
(HUM), Moralism (MOR), Naturalism (NAT), Negativism (NEG),
and Utilitarianism (UTI). Under the reduced-model
hypothesis, BAI subscales include Biophilia (PHI) and
Biophobia (PHO).
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nature-related, leisure-time activities. Part 2 of the SRAN
asks respondents to report how many times per year (on
average) that they between ages 6 and 18 participated in the
same activities specified in Part 1. It is predicted that,
under the full-model hypothesis, both parts of the SRAN will
be positively related to BAI E/S, BAI HUM, and BAI NAT. It
is predicted that, under the re-duced-model hypothesis, both
parts of the SRAN will be positively related to BAI PHI and
negatively related to BAI PHO.
The Appendix section of this dissertation includes the
instructions, items, and response options associated with
each of the aforementioned instruments. Furthermore, the
Appendix specifies the coding (i.e., standard or reverse)
for each instrument item. Finally, the Appendix notes the
subscale (where applicable) to which each instrument item
belongs.
Procedure
All participants completed all instruments online using
Survey Monkey between September and December 2010.
Presentation of instruments was in the same order with the
BAI presented first to eliminate possible response confounds
with other instruments. Along with responses to the
instruments, participants were asked to specify their age,
ethnicity, and gender so that this information can be
included in the description of the sample.
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CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS

Data Cleaning and Screening
Three-hundred thirty-four participants (334) completed
the BAI and other instruments (i.e., EAEAS, EMS, RNEPS, CNS,
NRS, and SRAN) described in Chapter 3. The response rate for
all instruments was very high, with no item collecting a
response from less than 329 out of the 334 participants and
with the mean, median, and modal number of participants
completing each item being 332.3, 333, and 333,
respectively. Consequently, median substitution was utilized
to fill in data points in the extremely few cases of nonresponse.
One of the assumptions in hypothesis testing with CFA
is that the variables under investigation meet assumptions
of normality; otherwise, CFA results cannot be trusted to
reflect adequately the fit (or lack thereof) of the model
being examined (Byrne, 2008).

For the BAI, the multivariate

kurtosis value (z=30.3939) indicated considerable nonnormality in the 48-item dataset, as the standard
demonstrating normality is a value less than 5.0 (Byrne,
2008). Moreover, seventeen of the BAI items had univariate
skewness absolute values greater than one. Fortunately, EQS
6.1 (i.e., the software that I would later use to conduct
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the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the BAI data)
includes an option that permits the user to generate
reliable statistics that are robust to violations of
normality assumptions.

As a result, I changed the syntax

in EQS 6.1 to produce robust goodness-of-fit and other
statistics. “Goodness-of-fit” statistics indicate the extent
to which the collected data produces the patterns of
correlations one would expect given the model being tested.
In other words, goodness-of-fit statistics reveal how well
the theory that undergirds an instrument (including the
presence of hypothesized latent variables and their paths of
influence on the indicators) is represented in the data
collected through the instrument.
Six empirically problematic BAI items (i.e., 6, 13, 33,
38, 43, and 47) were dropped prior to the first full CFA
analysis. Items 6, 33, and 38 exhibited extremely low means
(<2.0), which suggested they might need to be reverse-coded.
However, reverse coding these items would run contrary to
the BAI’s underlying theory. Items 13, 43, and 47 were
singletons, i.e., not sufficiently correlated with any
factors, and thus not useful for purposes of model testing.
Testing Hypothesized Models for Construct Validity
First, I tested the viability of the seven-factor model
with the remaining 42 indicators by utilizing the CFA in the
EQS 6.1 statistical software.

CFA is a type of “factor

analysis,” which is a general term describing a family of
statistical techniques that are used to detect or confirm
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the presence and structure of latent or unobservable
variables (or factors) by examining patterns (or matrices)
of correlations between observed variables (or indicators).
In CFA, the factors’ presence and structure (i.e., the
number of factors, their relationships with each other, and
their paths of influence on the indicators) are specified in
advance of data collection, usually based on a theory. CFA,
in turn, tests how closely the pre-specified (or
hypothesized) factor structure (also called a model) matches
the correlation matrices yielded by the actual data. Table
11 lists the factors (also called dimensions) and their
associated BAI indicators in the seven-factor model.
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Table 11
Seven-factor BAI model (full model) with 42 indicators
Factor
Indicators
Domi1. I like to watch animals perform or do tricks.
nionism 9. All dogs should be well trained.
(DOM)
17. All dogs should be kept on a leash.
25. A good animal obeys its owners.
41. I admire people like lion tamers and dogcatchers, who know
how to catch and control animals.
Huma3. I like animals I can hold and hug.
nism
11. A good animal is always happy to see its owner.
(HUM)
19. I like to see my pet happy.
27. Pets should be part of the family.
35. Animals’ feelings are as important as mine.
42. Zoos should show you animals that are cute and friendly.
45. I like to help sick or hurt animals.
Ecolo- 2. Even insects are important to nature.
gism/ 7. I like learning about the parts of plants and animals.
Scien- 10. It is okay for animals to eat each other to survive.
15. I like learning the names of plants and animals.
tism
(E/S)
18. I like learning about how animals and plants help one
another survive.
23. I think insects are fascinating.
26. All plants and animals are important in nature.
31. I like watching nature shows on television.
34. I like learning about how animals behave in the wild.
Mora4. People should not hurt animals.
lism
12. At zoos, you should not see the animals unless they want
(MOR)
you to.
20. Plants and animals deserve our protection.
28. I admire people who protect plants and animals.
36. Human land developers ought to do everything possible to
avoid removing vegetation and dislocating animals.
48. I think it is cruel to keep birds, even parakeets and
canaries, in cages.
Natu5. I like to go where animals live in the wild.
ralism 14. I like the sounds of wind and rain.
(NAT)
21. I like the sounds that animals make.
29. I like the smell of plants and animals in the wild.
37. I like the feel of grass and sand under my bare feet.
46. I like the sound of rivers, streams, and washes.
40. I like to swim in lakes, rivers, and oceans.
Nega22. I don’t like getting dirty when I go outside.
tivism 30. It’s usually too hot or too cold to enjoy being outdoors.
(NEG)
44. Insects that will bite or sting me are everywhere in nature.
Utilita- 8. I like useful animals, such as horses, police dogs, and
rianism
seeing-eye dogs.
(UTI)
16. The best plants and animals are those that people can eat
or make into other things.
24. It’s okay to hunt animals for food.
32. Plants and animals are around for people to use.
39. Nature is good because it gives us many things we need.

To evaluate the fit of the 7 hypothesized
factors/dimensions on the BAI to the data collected, I
examined the EQS-generated, CFA statistics listed and
described in Table 12.
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Table 12
EQS 6.1 CFA statistics used to evaluate BAI model fit
Statistic

Provides evidence of model fit
if:
< 2.58
(Byrne, 2008)

Average off-diagonal
standardized residual
% of standardized residuals
between 0.2 and -0.2
p value of
Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2
(S-B χ2)
p value of
Mean- & variance-adjusted χ2
(MVA χ2)
Bentler-Bonett normed fit index
(NFI)
Comparative fit index (CFI)

> 95%
> 0.050
(Kline, 2005; Byrne, 2008)
> 0.050
(Kline, 2005; Byrne, 2008)
> 0.949
(Byrne, 2008)
> 0.949
(Byrne, 2008)
> 0.949
(Byrne, 2008)
Within RMSEA 90% confidence
interval (CI) surrounding 0.05
(excellent fit) or 0.08 (good
fit)
(Byrne, 2008)

Bollen's (IFI) fit index
Root mean-square error of
approximation (RMSEA)20

Evidence of model fit for the seven factor model with
the 42 indicators listed in Table 11 was mixed, with most
fit indices suggesting a mediocre fit: S-B χ2 (df=798)=
2027.53, p=0.00; MVA χ2 (df=155)=393.16, p=0.00; NFI=0.863;
CFI=0.912 ; and IFI=0.912. However, the average off-diagonal
standardized residual was a modest 0.0774, and almost 95% of
the standardized residuals fell between 0.2 and 0.2.
Moreover, RMSEA=0.068, with a CI spanning from 0.064 to
0.072, meaning that the probability is 90% that the true

Byrne (2008) notes that RMSEA “has only recently been
recognized as one of the most informative criteria in
covariance structure modeling.” One of the virtues of RMSEA
is that, unlike other fit indices, it produces a 90%
confidence interval around its point estimates, thus
providing the researcher more information regarding the
precision of its estimates.
20
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value of RMSEA falls between 0.064 and 0.072, and is greater
than 90% that the true value of RMSEA is less than the
threshold for good fit noted in Table 12.
Next, I tested the viability of the two-factor model
utilizing EQS 6.1 and the 42 remaining items. Table 13 lists
the factors and their associated indicators in the twofactor model.
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Table 13
Two-factor BAI model (reduced model) with 42 indicators
Factor
Biophilia
(PHI)

2.
3.
4.
5.
7.
10.
11.
12.
14.
15.
18.
19.
20.
21.
23.
26.
27.
28.
29.
31.
34.
35.
36.
37.
40.
42.
45.
46.
48.

Biophobia
(PHO)

1.
8.
9.
16.
17.
22.
24.
25.
30.
32.
39.
41.
44.

Indicators
Even insects are important to nature.
I like animals I can hold and hug.
People should not hurt animals.
I like to go where animals live in the wild.
I like learning about the parts of plants and animals.
It is okay for animals to eat each other to survive.
A good animal is always happy to see its owner.
At zoos, you should not see the animals unless they want
you to.
I like the sounds of wind and rain.
I like learning the names of plants and animals.
I like learning about how animals and plants help one
another survive.
I like to see my pet happy.
Plants and animals deserve our protection.
I like the sounds that animals make.
I think insects are fascinating.
All plants and animals are important in nature.
Pets should be part of the family.
I admire people who protect plants and animals.
I like the smell of plants and animals in the wild.
I like watching nature shows on television.
I like learning about how animals behave in the wild.
Animals’ feelings are as important as mine.
Human land developers ought to do everything possible to
avoid removing vegetation and dislocating animals.
I like the feel of grass and sand under my bare feet.
I like to swim in lakes, rivers, and oceans.
Zoos should show you animals that are cute and friendly.
I like to help sick or hurt animals.
I like the sound of rivers, streams, and washes.
I think it is cruel to keep birds, even parakeets and
canaries, in cages.
I like to watch animals perform or do tricks.
I like useful animals, such as horses, police dogs, and
seeing-eye dogs.
All dogs should be well trained.
The best plants and animals are those that people can eat
or make into other things.
All dogs should be kept on a leash.
I don’t like getting dirty when I go outside.
It’s okay to hunt animals for food.
A good animal obeys its owners.
It’s usually too hot or too cold to enjoy being outdoors.
Plants and animals are around for people to use.
Nature is good because it gives us many things we need.
I admire people like lion tamers and dogcatchers, who know
how to catch and control animals.
Insects that will bite or sting me are everywhere in nature.

Evidence of model fit for the two-factor model with the
42 indicators listed in Table 13 was nil. Specifically, the
iterative process through which EQS 6.1 calculates model fit
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statistics failed to converge, even after 500 iterations.
This outcome suggests that biophilia, at least as it is
measured through the BAI, has more than two dimensions.
Developing a New Model
Given that the full (i.e., seven-factor) model
exhibited limited and conflicting evidence of fit and the
reduced (i.e., two-factor) model produced no evidence of fit
whatsoever, I decided in consultation with my advisor (and
the committee) to permit this investigation to become more
exploratory in nature. Thus, I utilized SPSS 19 statistical
software to run exploratory factor analyses (EFA)
thereby develop two new models.

21

and

I then utilized CFA to test

one of these models for construct validity.
To develop the two new models, I conducted two EFAs on
the 42-item set of BAI indicators to explore factorindicator relationships in potential four-factor and fivefactor solutions.

In the former solution, the four factors

each had eigenvalues that exceeded 2.0 and that altogether
accounted for more than 39% of the variance in the
indicators. In the latter solution, the five factors each
had eigenvalues that exceeded 1.8 and that altogether
accounted for 43% of the variance in the indicators.
Next, I examined the factor loadings of the indicators

21

Like CFA, EFA is a type of factor analysis. However,
unlike CFA, EFA does not test a pre-specified model.
Instead, based on the correlations between the indicators,
EFA produces a model that best fits the data. Thus, EFA
generates empirically derived models rather than testing
theoretically derived ones.
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in the four-factor model to ascertain which indicators did
and did not exhibit productive associations with the
underlying factors in a rotated component matrix. (I chose
the four-factor model because it was more parsimonious than
the five-factor model while at the same time accounting for
nearly as much variance in the indicators.) An indicator
with a productive association loaded substantially (i.e., at
a value of 0.4 or higher) on at least one factor without
loading even minimally (i.e., at an absolute value of 0.3 or
higher) on any other factor. In the four-factor solution, 23
indicators exhibited productive associations and thus were
retained for testing in a CFA model.
Table 14 lists the factors and their associated
indicators in the new four-factor BAI model.
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Table 14
Four-factor BAI model with 23 indicators
Factor
Curiosity
(A hybrid of
Naturalism
and
Ecologism/
Scientism)

5.
7.
15.
18.
21.
23.
31.
34.

Morality
(Moralism with a
dash of
Humanism)

40.
4.
20.
28.
35.
36.

Necessity
(Hybrid of
Utilitarianism and
Ecologism/
Scientism)
Security
(Mostly
Dominionism
with a splash of
Humanism and
Negativism)

2.
10.
39.
9.
11.
25.
41.
42.
44.

Indicators
I like to go where animals live in the wild.
I like learning about the parts of plants and
animals.
I like learning the names of plants and
animals.
I like learning about how animals and plants
help one another survive.
I like the sounds that animals make.
I think insects are fascinating.
I like watching nature shows on television.
I like learning about how animals behave in
the wild.
I like to swim in lakes, rivers, and oceans.
People should not hurt animals.
Plants and animals deserve our protection.
I admire people who protect plants and
animals.
Animals’ feelings are as important as mine.
Human land developers ought to do everything
possible to avoid removing vegetation and
dislocating animals.
Even insects are important to nature.
It is okay for animals to eat each other to
survive.
Nature is good because it gives us many things
we need.
All dogs should be well trained.
A good animal is always happy to see its
owner.
A good animal obeys its owners.
I admire people like lion tamers and
dogcatchers, who know how to catch and
control animals.
Zoos should show you animals that are cute
and friendly.
Insects that will bite or sting me are
everywhere in nature.

Testing the New Model for Construct Validity
Although the S-B χ2 and MVA χ2 p values for the new
model described in Table 14 did not exceed 0.05, the values
obtained through CFA for nearly all the other fit indicators
and fit indices provided evidence of good-to-excellent model
fit. The average off-diagonal standardized residual was only
0.0619; almost 98% of the standardized residuals fell
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between 0.2 and 0.2; NFI=0.925; CFI=0.963; IFI=0.963; and
RMSEA=0.051, with a CI spanning from 0.044 to 0.059. (As
previously noted in Table 12, 0.05 and 0.08, respectively,
are the RMSEA thresholds for good and excellent fit.)
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the Curiosity,
Morality, Necessity, and Security subscales were 0.874,
0.778, 0.444, and 0.575, respectively. The reliabilities for
the Curiosity and Morality subscales were good, while the
reliabilities for the Necessity and Security subscales did
not meet the recommended minimum of .70. Nevertheless, the
later values were not atypical or extreme when compared to
corresponding values for well-established measures of
environmental attitudes and beliefs (cf., Tables 9 and 10).
Testing the New Model for Convergent & Discriminant Validity
To collect evidence of convergent and discriminant
validity for the new model, I examined the correlations
between each of the new model’s four factors and the
subscales of the already established measures described in
Chapter 3. However, before I could run the necessary
correlational analyses, I had to create subject scores for
each of new model’s factors. To accomplish this task, I had
three options:
1) Equally weight each subject’s response to each item;
2) Weight each subject’s response to each item by the
factor loading in the rotated component matrix that
SPSS generated as part of the EFA I conducted
during the development of the new model; and
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3) Weight each subject’s response to each item by the
factor loading in the standardized solution that
EQS generated as part of the CFA I conducted on the
new model.
I utilized all three options rather than choose between
them. Table 15 shows the correlations between the new model’s four BAI factors and the three subscales--Ecocentric
(ECO), Anthropocentric (ANT), and Apathy Toward Nature
(APA)--of the Ecocentric/ Anthropocentric/ Environmental
Apathy Scale (EAEAS). Correlations in boldface evince the
presence of convergent validity. Correlations in italics
evince the presence of discriminant validity. A comparison
across the three options showed a very consistent pattern;
thus all of the three options suggested the same
interpretation of results.

Table 15
Correlations between BAI factors and EAEAS subscales
BAI Subscale
(Weighting option
utilized)
Curiosity (Equal)
Morality (Equal)
Necessity (Equal)
Security (Equal)
Curiosity (EQS)
Morality (EQS)
Necessity (EQS)
Security (EQS)
Curiosity (SPSS)
Morality (SPSS)
Necessity (SPSS)
Security (SPSS)
**
p < 0.01
(2-tailed)

EAEAS ECO
0.613**
0.579**
0.439**
-0.039**
0.602**
0.583**
0.446**
-0.035**
0.601**
0.578**
0.427**
-0.039**
*
p < 0.05
(2-tailed)
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EAEAS APA
-0.330**
-0.537**
-0.261**
0.268**
-0.331**
-0.541**
-0.275**
0.230**
-0.331**
-0.533**
-0.249**
0.260**

EAEAS ANT
-0.054**
-0.150**
-0.056**
0.446**
-0.056**
-0.149**
-0.066**
0.422**
-0.059**
-0.150**
-0.060**
0.446**

Table 16 shows the correlations between the new model’s four
BAI factors and the three subscales--Biospheric (BIO),
Altruistic (ALT), and Egotistic (EGO)--of the Environmental
Motives Scale (EMS).

Table 16
Correlations between BAI factors and EMS subscales
BAI Subscale
(Weighting option
utilized)
Curiosity (Equal)
Morality (Equal)
Necessity (Equal)
Security (Equal)
Curiosity (EQS)
Morality (EQS)
Necessity (EQS)
Security (EQS)
Curiosity (SPSS)
Morality (SPSS)
Necessity (SPSS)
Security (SPSS)
**
p < 0.01
(2-tailed)

EMS BIO

EMS ALT

0.387**
0.553**
0.263**
-0.056**
0.392**
0.556**
0.278**
-0.047**
0.392**
0.550**
0.246**
-0.055**
*
p < 0.05
(2-tailed)

0.072**
0.216**
0.030**
0.133**
0.079**
0.220**
0.031**
0.129**
0.078**
0.216**
0.017**
0.134**

EMS EGO
-0.084**
0.091**
-0.057**
0.253**
-0.083**
0.095**
-0.065**
0.258**
-0.083**
0.095**
-0.065**
0.258**

Table 17 shows the correlations between the new model’s
factors and the Revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale
(RNEPS).
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Table 17
Correlations between BAI factors and RNEPS
BAI Subscale
(Weighting option utilized)
Curiosity (Equal)
Morality (Equal)
Necessity (Equal)
Security (Equal)
Curiosity (EQS)
Morality (EQS)
Necessity (EQS)
Security (EQS)
Curiosity (SPSS)
Morality (SPSS)
Necessity (SPSS)
Security (SPSS)
**
p < 0.01
(2-tailed)

RNEPS
0.218**
0.536**
0.174**
-0.248**
0.216**
0.537**
0.184**
-0.234**
0.215**
0.534**
0.166**
-0.249**
*

p < 0.05
(2-tailed)

Table 18 shows the correlations between the new model’s
factors and the Connectedness to Nature Scale (CNS).

Table 18
Correlations between BAI factors and CNS
BAI Subscale
(Weighting option utilized)
Curiosity (Equal)
Morality (Equal)
Necessity (Equal)
Security (Equal)
Curiosity (EQS)
Morality (EQS)
Necessity (EQS)
Security (EQS)
Curiosity (SPSS)
Morality (SPSS)
Necessity (SPSS)
Security (SPSS)
**
p < 0.01
(2-tailed)

CNS
0.490**
0.594**
0.310**
-0.096**
0.490**
0.596**
0.317**
-0.087**
0.488**
0.596**
0.300**
-0.097**
*

p < 0.05
(2-tailed)

Table 19 shows the correlations between the new model’s
factors and the three subscales--Self (SEL), Perspective
(PER), or Experience (EXP)--of the Nature Relatedness Scale
(NRS).

90

Table 19
Correlations between BAI factors and NRS subscales
BAI Subscale
(Weighting option
utilized)
Curiosity (Equal)
Morality (Equal)
Necessity (Equal)
Security (Equal)
Curiosity (EQS)
Morality (EQS)
Necessity (EQS)
Security (EQS)
Curiosity (SPSS)
Morality (SPSS)
Necessity (SPSS)
Security (SPSS)
**
p < 0.01
(2-tailed)

NRS SEL

NRS PER

0.550**
0.543**
0.293**
-0.044**
0.550**
0.543**
0.305**
-0.043**
0.548**
0.546**
0.283**
-0.046**
*
p < 0.05
(2-tailed)

NRS EXP

0.238**
0.529**
0.129**
-0.228**
0.240**
0.530**
0.138**
-0.192**
0.239**
0.528**
0.121**
-0.220**

0.557**
0.155**
0.227**
-0.040**
0.561**
0.157**
0.227**
-0.045**
0.564**
0.154**
0.227**
-0.043**

To facilitate analysis, data from each item in the Survey of
Recreational Activities in Nature (SRAN) was re-coded
according to the scheme depicted in Table 20.

Table 20
Recoding of SRAN data
Original Response
0 times
1 to 2 times
3 to 4 times
5 to 6 times
7 to 8 times
9 to 10 times
11 or more times

Recoded as
0.0
1.5
3.5
5.5
7.5
9.5
11.5

Next, the data was summed across items for each SRAN part,
i.e., across Part 1 (participation in nature-related
activities in the past 12 months) and across Part 2
(participation in nature-related activities between ages 6
and 18). Table 21 shows the correlations between the new
model’s four BAI factors and the two parts of the SRAN.
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Table 21
Correlations between BAI factors and SRAN
BAI Subscale
(Weighting option utilized)
Curiosity (Equal)
Morality (Equal)
Necessity (Equal)
Security (Equal)
Curiosity (EQS)
Morality (EQS)
Necessity (EQS)
Security (EQS)
Curiosity (SPSS)
Morality (SPSS)
Necessity (SPSS)
Security (SPSS)
**
p < 0.01
(2-tailed)

SRAN, Part 1
Past 12 months
0.407**
0.093**
0.156**
0.044**
0.397**
0.093**
0.154**
0.046**
0.400**
0.090**
0.157**
0.044**
*
p < 0.05
(2-tailed)
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SRAN, Part 2
Ages 6 to 18
0.320**
0.056**
0.100**
0.029**
0.311**
0.057**
0.100**
0.034**
0.314**
0.053**
0.096**
0.030**

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to construct and validate
a reliable, stable, and valid instrument, called the
Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI) that utilized Stephen
Kellert’s typology of biophilic attitudes, which are
described in Table 1 and which Kellert spent more than two
decades attempting to measure via the development and
administration of various survey instruments. Kellert argued
that these attitudes were a manifestation of "biophilia,"
which, according to the naturalist E.O. Wilson, is an innate
predisposition among humans to connect with other forms of
life, especially in ways that have proven advantageous from
an evolutionary standpoint.
Viability of BAI as a Seven- or Two-factor Instrument
The BAI began as a 48-item measure (subsequently
reduced to 42 items, as previously discussed, because six
items needed to be eliminated for empirical reasons) that
ostensibly gauged a respondent’s biophilic attitudes on
seven Kellert-based dimensions or factors: Naturalism,
Moralism, Ecologism-Scientism, Negativism, Utilitarianism,
Humanism, and Dominionism (cf., Table A.1). The viability of
this seven-dimension model, as well as that of an
alternative two-dimension model (cf., Table A.2), was tested
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via confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Unfortunately,
evidence of viability (defined in terms of model fit) was
mixed for the seven-factor model and non-existent for the
two-factor model.
The weakness of the seven-factor model and total
unviability of the two-factor model were consistent with the
results obtained by other researchers who have attempted to
develop instruments based on Kellert’s typology (cf., Table
6), with the number of factors identified in their studies
ranging between three and six (Drews, 2002; Thompson &
Mintzes, 2002; Rauwald & Moore, 2002; Barney et. al., 2005;
Lukas & Ross, 2005; Slovokia, Prokop, & Kubiatko, 2008).
Considered collectively, the results of those studies and
this dissertation strongly suggest that biophilia as a
measurable construct is multidimensional but far less so
than the models proposed in Kellert’s work, which featured
between seven and ten dimensions.
Investigation of a New Model
Since neither the seven-dimensional or two-dimensional
model was stable, I utilized exploratory factor analysis
(EFA) to empirically generate a new model that better fit
the data. The result of that effort was a four-factor
solution that utilized 23 of the BAI indicators (cf., Table
14), but not precisely according to Kellert’s theoretical
framework since items from different BAI dimensions were
sometimes drawn together in the new set of four factors. For
example, the first factor produced in the EFA included items
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formerly grouped in the BAI Naturalism dimension or the BAI
Ecologism/Scientism dimension. As a result, I named each of
the four factors based on the theme that the items
associated with it seemed collectively to suggest (cf.,
Table 14). The factor Curiosity includes a blend of
indicators that were originally part of the BAI Naturalism
or Ecologism/Scientism dimensions and suggests the
respondent has an intense interest in learning about plants
and animals, especially by spending time in natural
settings. The Morality factor subsumes mostly indicators
originally assigned to BAI Moralism. Thus, it is appropriate
to declare, for all intents and purposes, the Morality
factor and the Moralism dimension as synonymous. The
Security factor includes indicators from the BAI
Dominionism, Humanism, and Negativism dimensions. However,
all these indicators focused on a common theme: nature is
dangerous or undesirable when not subject to human control.
The Necessity factor contains indicators from the BAI
Utilitarianism and Ecologism/Scientism dimensions. The
Necessity items suggest that respondents strong on this
dimension have a very practical, dispassionate view of
nature.
Items Excluded from the New Model
Nineteen of the original BAI items were not included in
the alternative model because, in the EFA analysis, they
failed to load strongly on any of the four new factors or
they loaded on more than one factor (i.e., cross-loaded).
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Table 22 depicts the patterns of non-loading and crossloading that occurred.

Table 22
BAI items not loading cleanly or at all
Factors
None (X)

X

C

M

N

S

12,14,16,
17,22,30,
48

Curiosity (C)

--

Morality (M)

3, 45

--

Necessity (N)

29,37,46

24,26

--

Security (S)

1,8

19,27

1, 3222

--

The failure of many of these items to load strongly or
cleanly--and thus not function well as indicators in a new
instrument--can be understood in many instances through a
close inspection of the items’ wordings. As shown in Table
22, items 12, 16, 17, and 48 did not load strongly on any of
the four factors. The content of these four items are
similar in that they represent positions with which most
respondents could not express strong agreement or
disagreement. For example, in considering item #12 (At zoos,
you should not see the animals unless they want you to.), it
is possible that respondents were reluctant to agree because
seeing animals is the primary reasons most people visit zoos
but also were hesitant to disagree as that might imply
endorsing the practice of forcing captive animals into
22

Item #1 loads on C, N, and S. Item #32 loads on M, N, and

S.
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public view to satisfy the whims of zoo patrons. Similarly,
item #17 (All dogs should be kept on a leash) likely failed
to elicit much agreement or disagreement because of the wide
variety of circumstances under which respondents, regardless
of how they feel about the nature and parameters of proper
relationships between humans and canines, might encounter or
interact with dogs.
Items 14, 22, and 30, which also failed to load strongly on any of the factors, were all focused specifically on
the sensory experience of being outdoors, but none of these
items made any reference to flora or fauna. For example,
item 14 focuses on the sounds of wind and rain; item 22, on
being outdoors and one’s feeling of cleanliness; and item
30, one’s typical level of comfort with outdoor
temperatures. The lack of strong loading by these items
suggests that respondents’ attitudes toward nature are not
shaped significantly by physical sensations associated with
personal hygiene or meteorological conditions.
Items 24 and 26 crossloaded on the Morality and the
Necessity factors. Item 24 (It’s okay to hunt animals for
food.) loaded negatively on the Morality factor but positively on the Necessity factor, drawing disagreement from
respondents with the former attitudinal trait and agreement
from those with the latter trait but, for purposes of
instrument development, making it difficult to ascertain to
which trait any response to this item should be ascribed.
Item 26 (All plants and animals are important to nature.)
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loaded higher on Necessity than on Morality, but it is easy
to see how persons with high levels of the Morality attitude
and those with high levels of the Necessity attitude might
interpret this item in different ways but agree with it
nonetheless.
Items 19 (I like to see my pet happy.) and 27 (Pets
should be part of the family.) loaded strongly on both
Morality and Security. Persons with high levels of Morality
may have agreed with item 19 due to a belief that pets
deserve some measure of happiness or contentment while
persons with high levels of Security may view happy pets as
non-threatening to and protective of their owners. To
persons with high levels of Morality, pets who are family
members are afforded a status equal to (or nearly equal to)
the humans with which it resides. In contrast, to persons
with high levels of Security, pets that are part of the
family are likely seen as more likely to defend other family
members, much like wolves defend other members of their
pack. Thus, items 19 and 27 elicit agreement from both
Morality and Security-driven respondents, though for very
different reasons.
Items 1 (I like to watch animals perform or do tricks.)
and 8 (I like useful animals, such as horses, police dogs,
and seeing-eye dogs.) loaded strongly on both Curiosity and
Security. These items may appeal to respondents with high
levels of Curiosity because the situations they depict are
opportunities during which humans interact with animals,
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while respondents with high levels of Security view these
situations as instances where potentially dangerous animals
are aptly controlled by humans and made to promote human
safety.
Correlations Between the BAI New Model’s Four Factors and
Other Environmental Attitude Scales
As shown in Tables 15 to 19 and Table 21, correlations
between the new model’s factors and other environmental
attitude scales provided a considerable amount of evidence
of convergent and discriminant validity for the new model.
The BAI Curiosity factor correlated strongly (i.e., |r|
> 0.4), positively, and significantly with the EAEAS ECO
subscale, which measures respondents’ ecocentric attitudes
toward nature, i.e., "appreciating nature for its own sake,
positive affect and stress reduction associated with nature,
and seeing connectedness between humans and animals"(GagnonThompson & Barton, 1994); the EMS BIO subscale, which
measures the extent to which a respondents concern for the
environment is biospheric, i.e., motivated by concern for
other living things; the CNS scale, which measures ". . . an
individual’s affective, experiential connection to nature"
(Mayer & McPherson-Frantz, 2004); the NRS SEL subscale,
which represents "an internalized identification with
nature, reflecting feelings and thoughts about one’s
personal connection to nature"(Nisbet, et. al., 2008); the
NRS EXP subscale, which signifies the respondents’ feeling
of "physical familiarity with the natural world ... level of
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comfort with and desire to be out in nature"(Nisbet, et.
al., 2008); and the SRAN part 1 subscale, on which
respondents report their recent participation in common,
nature-related, leisure-time activities. Conversely, BAI
Curiosity was nearly uncorrelated (i.e., r < |0.1|) with EMS
ALT (which measures the extent to which a respondent’s
concern for the environment is altruistic, i.e., motivated
by concern for other people) and EMS EGO (which measures the
extent to which a respondent’s concern for the environment
is egoistic, i.e., motivated by self interest).
The BAI Morality factor correlated strongly,
positively, and significantly with the EAEAS ECO subscale;
the EMS BIO subscale; the RNEPS scale, which measures
respondents’ "‘primitive beliefs’ about the nature of the
earth and humanity’s relationship with it"(Dunlap, et. al.,
2000); the CNS scale; the NRS SEL subscale; and the NRS PER
subscale, which measures the extent to which the respondent
possesses an "external, nature-related worldview, a sense of
agency concerning individual human actions and their impact
on all living things" (Nisbet, et. al., 2008). In contrast,
BAI Morality is strongly, significantly, and negatively
correlated with the EAEAS APA subscale, which measures
respondents’ apathy toward nature, i.e., "lack of interest
in environmental issues, and a general belief that problems
in this area have been exaggerated"(Gagnon-Thompson &
Barton, 1994).
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The BAI Necessity factor correlated strongly,
significantly, and positively with the EAEAS ECO subscale,
the CNS scale, and the NRS SEL subscale.
The BAI Security factor correlated strongly,
significantly, and positively with the EAEAS ANT subscale,
which measures respondents’ anthropocentric attitudes toward
nature, i.e., "valuing nature because of the material or
physical benefits it can provide to humans" (Gagnon-Thompson
& Barton, 1994).
All of the aforementioned correlations between the new
model’s four subscales and already established measures of
environmental attitudes are exactly what one would expect.
The inspection of these correlations yielded no surprises.
Thus, it is credible to infer that the BAI new model exhibits a fair amount of convergent and discriminant validity.
Implications for Theory
Considering the results of the CFA and other related
studies, it is reasonable to conclude that biophilia as a
measurable construct is multidimensional but not to the
extent proposed in Kellert’s work. Furthermore, the results
of EFA provide some clues regarding how this construct might
be better conceptualized. For example, the EFA results
support the existence of Kellert’s Moralism dimension
(relabeled as “Morality” in the EFA results of this
dissertation). Morality correlated:
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Strongly and positively with the Ecocentric/
Anthropocentric/ Environmental Apathy Scale (EAEAS)
Ecocentric subscale (cf., Table 15);



Strongly and negatively with the EAEAS Environmental
Apathy subscale (cf., Table 15);



Strongly and positively with the Environmental Motives
Scale (EMS) Biospheric subscale (cf., Table 16);



Strongly and positively with the Revised New Ecological
Paradigm Scale (cf., Table 17); and



Strongly and positively with the Connectedness to
Nature Scale (cf., Table 18).
The EFA results also strongly suggest that Kellert’s

Naturalism and Ecologism/Scientism are actually a single
dimension (relabeled as “Curiosity” in the EFA results
section of this dissertation), a finding that on its face
makes considerable sense in that many people who enjoy
spending time in natural settings often possess a strong
interest in understanding wild fauna and flora. Moreover, in
the EFA results, we see that Curiosity correlated:


Strongly and positively with the EAEAS

Ecocentric

subscale (cf., Table 15);


Moderately and negatively with the EAEAS Environmental
Apathy subscale (cf., Table 15);



Moderately and positively with the EMS Biospheric
subscale (cf., Table 16);
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Strongly and positively with the Connectedness to
Nature Scale (cf., Table 18);



Strongly and positively with the Nature Relatedness
Scale (NRS) Self and Experience subscales (cf., Table
19); and



Moderately and positively with both parts of the Survey
of Recreational Activities in Nature (SRAN).
However, the EFA did not produce strong empirical

evidence for the existence of any of Kellert’s other
dimensions.
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CHAPTER 6

RECOMMENDATIONS

Implications for Future Research
The failure of the two-factor model in this study
suggests that biophilic attitudes--at least in so far as
they can be measured by pen-and-paper, self-report
instruments--are fairly complex. However, the weak
performance of the seven-factor model suggests that
attitudes are likely not as bifurcated as Kellert’s
theoretical framework implies. Of course, limitations of the
BAI as an instrument may be at least partly responsible for
these results. For example, it is possible that the wording
in some of the BAI items did not adequately or sufficiently
represent the Kellert dimension with which it was meant to
be associated. Alternatively, ineffective item wording may
have caused some items to correlate with the wrong Kellert
dimensions or strongly correlate with more than one
dimension. Moreover, results of this study may have been
impacted by the circumstances under which the BAI was
administered (i.e., online, through the online Survey Monkey
portal, which has limited item randomization capabilities).
Additionally, characteristics of the sample itself may have
influence the results, as the persons who completed the BAI
were self-selected and somewhat homogenous in terms of their
educational-background characteristics. Consequently, future
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attempts to empirically investigate the viability of
Kellert’s theoretical framework would probably benefit from
a more extensive and systematic review of instrument items
prior to data collection to ensure, as much as possible,
strong and unambiguous construct representation.
Limitations in this study associated with instrument
administration could also be ameliorated by creating
multiple forms of the BAI and the other instruments, with
each form presenting both instruments—and items within the
instruments--in different orders. Taking this strategy a
step further, the researcher could utilize both online and
in-person versions of each form, thus permitting the
researcher to detect whether the data-collection modality
(i.e., electronic vs. hardcopy; from a remote, unknown
location vs. in front of a live researcher; without any time
constraint vs. within a fixed amount of time; and so on)
significantly influences the results of the validation
effort. However, any researcher utilizing multiple forms
and/or multiple versions of each form would need to ensure
that the overall sample size and individual group sizes
(e.g., electronic vs. hardcopy respondents) are sufficient
for the statistical tests he or she plans to run.
Finally, as previously noted the nature of the sample
utilized in this dissertation make it difficult to
generalize the results to any broader population. Future
research with randomly selected samples of respondents from
a variety of backgrounds would help make the case that the
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results can apply to more than university undergraduates
studying education.
The four-factor BAI model constructed through the EFA
may indeed be the most parsimonious description of biophilic
attitudes, but to declare it so would be quite premature.
First, the four-factor BAI model will need to be tested with
additional samples to eliminate the possibility that the fit
achieved in this study was merely a chance occurrence.
However, before any new administrations of the BAI can
occur, additional items for the Necessity subscale will need
to be developed to increase the number of indicators
associated with this factor and, thereby, increase its
reliability, which in this study was only 0.444. Current
items in the Security factor should also be closely
inspected in an effort to ascertain which caused the
subscale’s reliability not to exceed 0.575.
Conclusions
The present research leads to two conclusions related to the
theoretical and practical utility of the BAI.

Regarding

theory, the BAI was constructed to assess the seven
dimensions proposed by Kellert (Naturalism, Humanism,
Moralism, Dominionism, Utilitarianism, Negativism, and
Ecologism/Scientism).

Given the poor fit of the BAI to the

seven-factor model suggested by Kellert’s theory, it is
doubtful that the theory is viable.

The complete failure of

the two-factor model (Biophilia and Biophobia), as well as
the mixed results of the four-factor model (Curiosity,
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Morality, Necessity, and Security) generated in the
exploratory analysis, suggest a multiple-factor solution of
some type, yet do not provide enough specificity to clearly
articulate the nature of these factors. Support was
particularly weak for the existence of a Necessity factor,
and by extension for the Kellert dimension (Utilitarianism)
with which Necessity is on theoretical grounds most closely
associated, suggesting little or no inclination on the part
of BAI respondents to affiliate with nature on the basis of
its perceived usefulness. Of course, since most of the BAI
respondents were urban residents, this result may be merely
a sampling artifact. However, this result, if confirmed in
future studies, could point to an attitudinal shift wherein
people perceive and affiliate with nature less in terms of
its utility value.

Nevertheless and overall, the present

findings suggest the need for a revised theory and a better
articulation of dimensions related to biophilia and
biophobia.
Regarding practice, the four-factor solution of the BAI
showed acceptable construct validity, as well as good
convergent and discriminant validity with other related
measures.

Consequently, the BAI may be useful to

environmental educators when used in conjunction with other
instruments until a better version of the BAI is developed,
or a new instrument based on a revised theory is available.
Currently, there are no viable instruments that assess
biophilic and biophobic attitudes among adults; therefore,
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the BAI may provide practical utility when assessing these
beliefs. Thus, the BAI may serve as a tool that
environmental educators can utilize, while developing and
adjusting lesson plans, to assess and capitalize upon (or
counteract, if necessary) the biophilic attitudes of their
students. However, any user of the BAI in its current form
should do so cautiously and remain mindful of the unsettled
state of the underlying theory, the instrument’s present
impotency vis-à-vis the detection of Necessity-related
attitudes, and the biases introduced into this investigation
of the BAI’s validity by the particular characteristics of
the non-probability sample that was utilized.
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APPENDIX

INSTRUMENTS

Figure A.1 displays the instructions, items, and response options for the Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI).

Figure A.1
Biophilic Attitudes Inventory
DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
Slightly
Agree

Strongly
Agree

1
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4
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1
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1

2
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1
1

2
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3
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1
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4

5

Neutral

Slightly
Disagree
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Strongly
Disagree
01. I like to watch animals
perform or do tricks.
02. Even insects are important
to nature.
03. I like animals I can hold
and hug.
04. People should not hurt animals.
05. I like to go where animals
live in the wild.
06. We should get rid of all
poisonous animals like
rattlesnakes and scorpions.
07. I like learning about the
parts of plants and animals.
08. I like useful animals, such
as horses, police dogs, and
seeing-eye dogs.
09. All dogs should be well
trained.
10. It is okay for animals to
eat each other to survive.
11. A good animal is always
happy to see its owner.
12. At zoos, you should not see
the animals unless they
want you to.

DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
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Agree
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Neutral

Slightly
Disagree
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Strongly
Disagree
13. A good animal has no owner
and lives in the wild.
14. I like the sounds of wind
and rain.
15. I like learning the names of
plants and animals.
16. The best plants and animals
are those that people can eat
or make into other things.
17. All dogs should be kept on
a leash.
18. I like learning about how
animals and plants help one
another survive.
19. I like to see my pet happy.
20. Plants and animals deserve
our protection.
21. I like the sounds that
animals make.
22. I don’t like getting dirty
when I go outside.
23. I think insects are
fascinating.
24. It's okay to hunt animals for
food.
25. A good animal obeys its owners.
26. All plants and animals are
important in nature.
27. Pets should be part of the
family.
28. I admire people who protect
plants and animals.
29. I like the smell of plants
and animals in the wild.
30. It’s usually too hot or too
cold to enjoy being outdoors.
31. I like watching nature shows
on television.
32. Plants and animals are around
for people to use.
33. Wild animals should be
captured and tamed.

DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
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1
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41. I admire people like lion
tamers and dogcatchers, who
know how to catch and
control animals.
42. Zoos should show you
animals that are cute and
friendly.
43. I am really bothered by the
sight of weeds in a lawn.
44. Insects that will bite or
sting me are everywhere in
nature.
45. I like to help sick or hurt
animals.
46. I like the sound of rivers,
streams, and washes.
47. Animals in the wild are
dangerous.
48. I think it is cruel to keep
birds, even parakeets and
canaries, in cages.

1

2
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Neutral

Strongly
Disagree
34. I like learning about how
animals behave in the wild.
35. Animals’ feelings are as
important as mine.
36. Human land developers ought
to do everything possible
to avoid removing
vegetation and dislocating
animals.
37. I like the feel of grass
and sand under my bare
feet.
38. We should get rid of insects
as much as we can.
39. Nature is good because it
gives us many things we need.
40. I like to swim in lakes,
rivers, and oceans.

Each BAI item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) and
its associated subscales are shown in Table A.1.

Table A.1
Biophilic Attitudes Inventory (BAI) item codings and
subscales
1.
9.
17.
25.
33.
41.

2.
7.
10.
15.
18.

BAI Item
I like to watch animals
perform or do tricks.
All dogs should be well
trained.
All dogs should be kept
on a leash.
A good animal obeys its
owners.
Wild animals should be
captured and tamed.
I admire people like lion
tamers and dogcatchers,
who know how to catch and
control animals.
Even insects are important
to nature.
I like learning about the
parts of plants and
animals.
It is okay for animals
to eat each other to
survive.
I like learning the names
of plants and animals.
I like learning about how
animals and plants help
one another survive.

Coding
Standard

Subscale23
DOM

Standard

DOM

PHO

Standard

DOM

PHO

Standard

DOM

PHO

Standard

DOM

PHO

Standard

DOM

PHO

Standard

E/S

PHI

Standard

E/S

PHI

Standard

E/S

PHI

Standard

E/S

PHI

Standard

E/S

PHI

23

Subscale24
PHO

Dominionism (DOM), Ecologism/Scientism (E/S), Humanism
(HUM), Moralism (MOR), Naturalism (NAT), Negativism (NEG),
Utilitarianism (UTI), the seven dimensions noted in
Hypotheses
#1 and #2 in Chapter 2.
24
Biophilia (PHI) and Biophobia (PHO), the two dimensions
noted in Hypothesis #3 and #4 in Chapter 2.
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23.
26.
31.
34.
3.
11.
19.
27.

BAI Item
I think insects are
fascinating.*
All plants and animals
are important in
nature.
I like watching nature
shows on television.
I like learning about
how animals behave in
the wild.
I like animals I can
hold and hug.
A good animal is always
happy to see its owner.
I like to see my pet
happy.
Pets should be part of
the family.

Coding
Standard

Subscale23
E/S

Subscale24
PHI

Standard

E/S

PHI

Standard

E/S

PHI

Standard

E/S

PHI

Standard

HUM

PHI

Standard

HUM

PHI

Standard

HUM

PHI

Standard

HUM

PHI

35.

Animals’ feelings are
as important as mine.

Standard

HUM

PHI

42.

Zoos should show you
animals that are cute
and friendly.

Standard

HUM

PHI

45.

I like to help sick or
hurt animals.

Standard

HUM

PHI

4.

People should not hurt
animals.

Standard

MOR

PHI

12.

At zoos, you should not
see the animals unless
they want you to.

Standard

MOR

PHI

20.

Plants and animals
deserve our protection.

Standard

MOR

PHI

28.

I admire people who
protect plants and
animals.

Standard

MOR

PHI

36.

Human land developers
ought to do everything
possible to avoid
removing vegetation and
dislocating animals.

Standard

MOR

PHI

48.

I think it is cruel to
keep birds, even
parakeets and canaries,
in cages.*

Standard

MOR

PHI

5.

I like to go where
animals live in the
wild.

Standard

NAT

PHI
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BAI Item

Coding

Subscale23

13.

A good animal has no
owner and lives in the
wild.

Standard

NAT

PHI

14.

I like the sounds of
wind and rain.

Standard

NAT

PHI

21.

I like the sounds that
animals make.

Standard

NAT

PHI

29.

I like the smell of
plants and animals in
the wild.

Standard

NAT

PHI

37.

I like the feel of
grass and sand under my
bare feet.

Standard

NAT

PHI

46.

I like the sound of
rivers, streams, and
washes.

Standard

NAT

PHI

40.

I like to swim in
lakes, rivers, and
oceans.

Standard

NAT

PHI

6.

We should get rid of all
poisonous animals like
rattlesnakes and
scorpions.

Standard

NEG

PHO

47.

Animals in the wild are
dangerous.

Standard

NEG

PHO

22.

I don’t like getting dirty
when I go outside.

Standard

NEG

PHO

30.

It’s usually too hot or
too cold to enjoy being
outdoors.

Standard

NEG

PHO

38.

We should get rid of
insects as much as we can.

Standard

NEG

PHO

43.

I am really bothered by
the sight of weeds in a
lawn.

Standard

NEG

PHO

44.

Insects that will bite or
sting me are everywhere in
nature.
I like useful animals,
such as horses, police
dogs, and seeing-eye dogs.

Standard

NEG

PHO

Standard

UTI

PHO

8.
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Subscale24

Coding

Subscale23

The best plants and
animals are those that
people can eat or make
into other things.
It’s okay to hunt animals
for food.

Standard

UTI

PHO

Standard

UTI

PHO

32.

Plants and animals are
around for people to use.

Standard

UTI

PHO

39.

Standard
UTI
Nature is good because it
gives us many things we
need.
*Item wording verbatim from Kellert (1976a)

PHO

BAI Item
16.

24.
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Subscale24

Figure A.2 displays the instructions, items, and
response options for Gagnon-Thompson and Barton’s (1994)
Ecocentric/ Anthropocentric/Environmental Apathy Scale
(EAEAS).

Figure A.2
Ecocentric/Anthropocentric/Environmental Apathy Scale
DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
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Strongly
Agree

One of the worst things about
over-population is that many
natural areas are getting
destroyed for development.
2. I can enjoy spending time in
natural settings just for the
sake of being out in nature.
3. Environmental threats such as
deforestation and ozone
depletion have been exaggerated.
4. The worst thing about the loss
of the rain forest is that it
will restrict the development of
new medicines.
5. Sometimes it makes me sad to see
forests cleared for agriculture.
6. It seems to me that most
conservationists are pessimistic
and somewhat paranoid.
7. I prefer wildlife reserves to
zoos.
8. The best thing about camping is
that it is a cheap vacation.
9. I do not think the problem of
depletion of natural resources is
as bad as many people make it out
to be.
10. I find it hard to get too concerned about environmental issues

Neutral

Strongly
Disagree

1.
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DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
Strongly
Agree

Neutral

Strongly
Disagree
11. It bothers me that humans are
running out of their supply of
oil.
12. I need time in nature to be
happy.
13. Science and technology will
eventually solve our problems
with pollution, overpopulation,
and diminishing resources.
14. The thing that concerns me most
about deforestation is that
there will not be enough lumber
for future generations.
15. I do not feel that humans are
dependent on nature to survive.
16. Sometimes when I am unhappy I
find comfort in nature.
17. Most environmental problems will
solve themselves given enough
time.
18. I don’t care about environmental
problems.
19. One of the most important
reasons to keep lakes and rivers
clean is so that people have a
place to enjoy water sports.
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20. I’m opposed to programs to
preserve wilderness, reduce
pollution, and conserve
resources.
21. It makes me sad to see natural
environments destroyed.
22. The most important reason for
conservation is human survival.
23. One of the best things about
recycling is that it saves
money.
24. Nature is important because of
what it can contribute to the
pleasure and welfare of humans.
25. Too much emphasis has been
placed on conservation.
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DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
Strongly
Agree

Neutral

Strongly
Disagree
26. Nature is valuable for its own
sake.
27. We need to preserve resources to
maintain a high quality of life.
28. Being out in nature is a great
stress reducer for me.
29. One of the most important
reasons to conserve is to ensure
a continued high standard of
living.
30. One of the most important
reasons to conserve is to
preserve wild areas.
31. Continued land development is a
good idea as long as a high
quality of life can be
preserved.
32. Sometimes animals seem almost
human to me.
33. Humans are as much a part of the
ecosystem as other animals.
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Each EAEAS item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) and its
associated subscale--Ecocentrism (ECO), Anthropocentrism
(ANT), or Environmental Apathy (APA)--are shown in Table
A.2.
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Table A.2
EAEAS item codings and subscales
Coding
Standard

Subscale
ECO

Standard

ECO

Standard

ECO

Standard

ECO

12. I need time in nature to be happy.

Standard

ECO

16. Sometimes when I am unhappy I find
comfort in nature.
21. It makes me sad to see natural
environments destroyed.
26. Nature is valuable for its own sake.

Standard

ECO

Standard

ECO

Standard

ECO

28. Being out in nature is a great stress
reducer for me.
30. One of the most important reasons to
conserve is to preserve wild areas.
32. Sometimes animals seem almost human to
me.
33. Humans are as much a part of the
ecosystem as other animals.
4.
The worst thing about the loss of the
rain forest is that it will restrict the
development of new medicines.
8. The best thing about camping is that it
is a cheap vacation.
11. It bothers me that humans are running out
of their supply of oil.
13. Science and technology will eventually
solve our problems with pollution,
overpopulation, and diminishing
resources.
14. The thing that concerns me most about
deforestation is that there will not be
enough lumber for future generations.
19. One of the most important reasons to
keep lakes and rivers clean is so that
people have a place to enjoy water
sports.
22. The most important reason for
conservation is human survival.
23. One of the best things about recycling
is that it saves money.
24. Nature is important because of what it
can contribute to the pleasure and
welfare of humans.
27. We need to preserve resources to
maintain a high quality of life.
29. One of the most important reasons to
conserve is to ensure a continued high
standard of living.
31. Continued land development is a good
idea as long as a high quality of life
can be preserved.

Standard

ECO

Standard

ECO

Standard

ECO

Standard

ECO

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

Standard

ANT

1.
2.
5.
7.

EAEAS Item
One of the worst things about overpopulation is that many natural areas
are getting destroyed for development.
I can enjoy spending time in natural
settings just for the sake of being out
in nature.
Sometimes it makes me sad to see forests
cleared for agriculture.
I prefer wildlife reserves to zoos.
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3.
6.
9.
10.
15.
17.
18.
20.
25.

EAEAS Item
Environmental threats such as
deforestation and ozone depletion have
been exaggerated.
It seems to me that most
conservationists are pessimistic and
somewhat paranoid.
I do not think the problem of depletion
of natural resources is as bad as many
people make it out to be.
I find it hard to get too concerned about
environmental issues.
I do not feel that humans are dependent
on nature to survive.
Most environmental problems will solve
themselves given enough time.
I don’t care about environmental
problems.
I’m opposed to programs to preserve
wilderness, reduce pollution, and
conserve resources.
Too much emphasis has been placed on
conservation.
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Coding
Standard

Subscale
APA

Standard

APA

Standard

APA

Standard

APA

Standard

APA

Standard

APA

Standard

APA

Standard

APA

Standard

APA

Figure A.3 displays the instructions, items, and
response options for Schultz’s (2000) Environmental Motives
Scale (EMS).

Figure A.3
Environmental Motives Scale
DIRECTIONS: People around the world are generally concerned about environmental problems because of the consequences that result from harming nature. However, people
differ in the consequences that concern them the most.
Please rate the following items for 1 (not important) to 7
(supreme importance) in response to the question: I am
concerned about environmental problems because of the
consequences for ______________.
Supreme
importance

Not
important

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

animals.
plants.
marine life.
birds.
me.
my future.
my lifestyle.
my health.
all people.
children.
people in my
community.
12. . . my children.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Each EMS item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) and its
associated subscale--Egoistic (EGO), Altruistic (ALT), and
Biospheric (BIO)--are shown in Table A.3.

Table A.3
EMS item codings and subscales
1.

. . .

EMS Item
animals.

Coding
Standard

Subscale
BIO

2.

. . .

plants.

Standard

BIO

3.

. . .

marine life.

Standard

BIO

4.

. . .

birds.

Standard

BIO

5.

. . .

me.

Standard

EGO

6.

. . .

my future.

Standard

EGO

7.

. . .

my lifestyle.

Standard

EGO

8.

. . .

my health.

Standard

EGO

9.

. . .

all people.

Standard

ALT

10. . . .

children.

Standard

ALT

11. . . .

people in my community.

Standard

ALT

12. . . .

my children.

Standard

ALT
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Figure A.4 displays the instructions, items, and
response options for Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, and Jones’
(2000) Revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale (RNEPS).

Figure A.4
Revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale
DIRECTIONS: Listed below are statements about the
relationship between humans and the environment. For each
statement, please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE
(SA), MILDLY AGREE (MA), are UNSURE (U), MILDLY DISAGREE
(MD), or STRONGLY DISAGREE (SD) with it.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

Despite our special abilities,
humans are still subject to the
laws of nature.
10. The so-called "ecological crisis"
facing humankind has been greatly
exaggerated.
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Strongly
Disagree

2.

We are approaching the limit of
the number of people the earth
can support.
Humans have the right to modify
the natural environment to suit
their needs.
When humans interfere with
nature, it often produces
disastrous consequences.
Human ingenuity will insure that
we do NOT make the earth
unlivable.
Humans are severely abusing the
environment.
The earth has plenty of natural
resources if we just learn how
to develop them.
Plants and animals have as much
right as humans to exist.
The balance of nature is strong
enough to cope with the impacts
of modern industrial nations.

Neutral

Strongly
agree

1.

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

DIRECTIONS: Listed below are statements about the
relationship between humans and the environment. For each
statement, please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE
(SA), MILDLY AGREE (MA), are UNSURE (U), MILDLY DISAGREE
(MD), or STRONGLY DISAGREE (SD) with it.
Strongly
Disagree
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Neutral

Strongly
agree
11. The earth is like a spaceship with
very limited room and resources.
12. Humans were meant to rule over
the rest of nature.
13. The balance of nature is very
delicate and easily upset.
14. Humans will eventually learn
enough about how nature works to
be able to control it.
15. If things continue in their
present course, we will soon
experience a major ecological
catastrophe.

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

SA

MA

U

MD

SD

Each RNEPS item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) is
shown in Table A.4.

Table A.4
RNEPS item codings
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

RNEPS Item
We are approaching the limit of the numbe
of people the earth can support.
Humans have the right to modify the
natural environment to suit their needs.
When humans interfere with nature, it
often produces disastrous consequences.
Human ingenuity will insure that we do
NOT make the earth unlivable.
Humans are severely abusing the
environment.
The earth has plenty of natural
resources if we just learn how to
develop them.
Plants and animals have as much right as
humans to exist.
The balance of nature is strong enough
to cope with the impacts of modern
industrial nations.
Despite our special abilities, humans are
still subject to the laws of nature.
The so-called "ecological crisis" facing
humankind has been greatly exaggerated.
The earth is like a spaceship with very
limited room and resources.
Humans were meant to rule over the rest
of nature.
The balance of nature is very delicate
and easily upset.
Humans will eventually learn enough
about how nature works to be able to
control it.
If things continue in their present
course, we will soon experience a major
ecological catastrophe.
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Coding
Standard

Subscale
N/A

Reverse

N/A

Standard

N/A

Reverse

N/A

Standard

N/A

Reverse

N/A

Standard

N/A

Reverse

N/A

Standard

N/A

Reverse

N/A

Standard

N/A

Reverse

N/A

Standard

N/A

Reverse

N/A

Standard

N/A

Figure A.5 displays the instructions, items, and
response options for Mayer and McPherson-Frantz’s (2004)
Connectedness to Nature Scale (CNS).

Figure A.5
Connectedness to Nature Scale
DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
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Strongly
Agree

I often feel a sense of oneness
with the natural world around me.
2. I think of the natural world as a
community to which I belong.
3. I recognize and appreciate the
intelligence of other living
organisms.
4. I often feel disconnected from
nature.
5. When I think of my life, I imagine
myself to be part of a larger
cyclical process of living.
6. I often feel a kinship with
animals and plants.
7. I feel as though I belong to the
Earth as equally as it belongs to
me.
8. I have a deep understanding of how
my actions affect the natural
world.
9. I often feel part of the web of
life.
10. I feel that all inhabitants of
Earth, human and nonhuman, share
a common "life force."
11. Like a tree can be part of a
forest, I feel embedded within
the broader natural world.
12. When I think of my place on
Earth, I consider myself to be a
top member of a hierarchy that
exists in nature.

Neutral

Strongly
Disagree

1.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
Strongly
Agree
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Neutral

Strongly
Disagree
13. I often feel like I am only a
small part of the natural world
around me, and that I am no more
important than the grass on the
ground or the birds in the trees.
14. My personal welfare is
independent of the welfare of the
natural world.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Each CNS item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) is shown
in Table A.5.

Table A.5
CNS item codings
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

CNS Item
I often feel a sense of oneness with the
natural world around me.
I think of the natural world as a
community to which I belong.
I recognize and appreciate the
intelligence of other living organisms.
I often feel disconnected from nature.

Coding
Standard

Subscale
N/A

Standard

N/A

Standard

N/A

Reverse

N/A

When I think of my life, I imagine
myself to be part of a larger cyclical
process of living.
I often feel a kinship with animals and
plants.
I feel as though I belong to the Earth as
equally as it belongs to me.
I have a deep understanding of how my
actions affect the natural world.
I often feel part of the web of life.

Standard

N/A

Standard

N/A

Standard

N/A

Standard

N/A

Standard

N/A

Standard

N/A

Standard

N/A

Reverse

N/A

Standard

N/A

Reverse

N/A

10. I feel that all inhabitants of Earth,
human and nonhuman, share a common "life
force."
11. Like a tree can be part of a forest, I
feel embedded within the broader natural
world.
12. When I think of my place on Earth, I
consider myself to be a top member of a
hierarchy that exists in nature.
13. I often feel like I am only a small part
of the natural world around me, and that
I am no more important than the grass on
the ground or the birds in the trees.
14. My personal welfare is independent of
the welfare of the natural world.
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Figure A.6 displays the instructions, items, and
response options for Nisbet, Zelenski, and Murphy’s (2008)
Nature Relatedness Scale (NRS).

Figure A.6
Nature Relatedness Scale
DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Strongly
Agree

2.

My connection to nature and the
environment is part of my
spirituality.
My relationship to nature is an
important part of who I am.
I feel very connected to all
living things and the earth.
I am not separate from nature, but
a part of nature.
I always think about how my
actions affect the environment.
I am very aware of environmental
issues.
I think a lot about the suffering
of animals.
Even in the middle of the city, I
notice nature around me.
My feelings about nature do not
affect how I live my life.
Humans have the right to use
natural resources any way we want.
Conservation is unnecessary
because nature is strong.
Animals, birds, and plants have
fewer rights than humans.
Some species are just meant to
die out or become extinct.
Nothing I do will change problems
in other places on the planet.
The state of nonhuman species is an
indicator of the future for humans

Neutral

Strongly
Disagree

1.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

DIRECTIONS: Please circle the number that indicates how
much you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements.
Strongly
Agree
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Neutral

Strongly
Disagree
16. The thought of being deep in the
woods, away from civilization, is
frightening.
17. My ideal vacation spot would be a
remote, wilderness area.
18. I enjoy being outdoors, even in
unpleasant weather.
19. I don’t often go out in nature.
20. I enjoy digging in the earth and
getting dirt on my hands.
21. I take notice of wildlife
wherever I am.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

1

2

3

4

5

Each NRS item’s coding (i.e., standard or reverse) and its
associated subscale--Self (SEL), Perspective (PER), or
Experience (EXP)--are shown in Table A.6.

Table A.6
NRS item codings and subscales
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

NRS Item
My connection to nature and the
environment is part of my spirituality.
My relationship to nature is an
important part of who I am.
I feel very connected to all living
things and the earth.
I am not separate from nature, but a part
of nature.
I always think about how my actions
affect the environment.
I am very aware of environmental issues.
I think a lot about the suffering of
animals.
Even in the middle of the city, I notice
nature around me.
My feelings about nature do not affect how
I live my life.
Humans have the right to use natural
resources any way we want.
Conservation is unnecessary because
nature is strong.
Animals, birds, and plants have fewer
rights than humans.
Some species are just meant to die out
or become extinct.
Nothing I do will change problems in
other places on the planet.
The state of nonhuman species is an
indicator of the future for humans.
The thought of being deep in the woods,
away from civilization, is frightening.
My ideal vacation spot would be a
remote, wilderness area.
I enjoy being outdoors, even in
unpleasant weather.
I don’t often go out in nature.

20. I enjoy digging in the earth and getting
dirt on my hands.
21. I take notice of wildlife wherever I am.

25

Coding25
Standard

Subscale
SEL

Standard

SEL

Standard

SEL

Standard

SEL

Standard

SEL

Standard

SEL

Standard

SEL

Standard

SEL

Reversed

SEL

Reversed

PER

Reversed

PER

Reversed

PER

Reversed

PER

Reversed

PER

Standard

PER

Reversed

EXP

Standard

EXP

Standard

EXP

Reversed

EXP

Standard

EXP

Standard

EXP

Nisbet et al. (2008) does not specify the coding for any
items except #11, which the articles note is “reversed.”
However, the coding of the other NRS items can be reasonably
inferred by examining the wording of each item and the
construct for which the item is an indicator.
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Figures A.7 and A.8 display the instructions, items, and
response options for parts 1 and 2 of the Survey of
Recreational Activities in Nature (SRAN).

Figure A.7
Survey of Recreational Activities in Nature (Part 1)
DIRECTIONS: Please check the box that corresponds to the
number of times in the past 12 months you participated in
each of the following activities.
3 to 4 times

5 to 6 times

7 to 8 times

9 to 10 times

11 or more times
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1 to 2 times

Went camping.
Went fishing.
Went for a walk or hike in
the desert or woods.
4. Worked in a garden or cared
for plants.
5. Swam in a river, lake, sea,
or ocean.
6. Watched or listened to birds,
insects, or other animals.
7. Collected objects in nature
such as rocks, leaves, fruit,
nuts, pinecones, insects, or
seashells.
8. Gazed at stars or watched
clouds.
9. Rode in a canoe, kayak,
sailboat, or other nonmotorized watercraft.
10. Rode a horse.
11. Went rock climbing.

0 times

1.
2.
3.

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
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□
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□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

□
□

Figure A.8
Survey of Recreational Activities in Nature (Part 2)
DIRECTIONS: Please check the box that corresponds to the
number of times per year (on average) that you between
ages 6 and 18 participated in each of the following
activities.
3 to 4 times

5 to 6 times

7 to 8 times

9 to 10 times

11 or more times
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1 to 2 times

Went camping.
Went fishing.
Went for a walk or hike in
the desert or woods.
4. Worked in a garden or cared
for plants.
5. Swam in a river, lake, sea,
or ocean.
6. Watched or listened to
birds, insects, or other
animals.
7. Collected objects in nature
such as rocks, leaves,
fruit, nuts, pinecones,
insects, or seashells.
8. Gazed at stars or watched
clouds.
9. Rode in a canoe, kayak,
sailboat, or other nonmotorized watercraft.
10. Rode a horse.
11. Went rock climbing.

0 times

1.
2.
3.

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
□

□
□
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